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ABSTRACT 
 
YINGCHUN JI: Issues of Marriage Timing in Different Cultural Contexts 
(Under the direction of Lisa D. Pearce) 
 
 This dissertation examines the interplay of economic and cultural motivations in the 
decision of when to marry. I draw on economic rational choice theory, social psychological 
reasoned action theory, and sociological norm theories to explain how economic and 
ideational factors pattern decision-making concerning marriage formation, both 
independently and interactively. I apply this approach to examine marriage timing in Nepal, 
and further investigate how marriage and education are juggled in Nepal. I then draw on the 
same theoretical approach to examine early marriage timing in the United States. In the 
context of Nepal, women’s economic factors can both increase marriage rates and help buy 
economic independence to avoid early marriage, depending on how strong cultural and 
familial pressures are. Men’s economic resources and pro-marriage cultural factors accelerate 
their transition to marriage, but under extreme cultural and familial pressure, economic 
factors have weaker effects. As to women’s post-marriage education in Nepal, both women’s 
and their parents’ education level is related to their high rates of continuing schooling after 
marriage. Further, women whose parents had more involvement in their marriage formation 
are, in general, more likely to continue their education, compared to those who had more 
autonomy concerning their marriage decision. However, the relationship reverses at the level 
of university education, with more college women in love marriages continuing their
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education than college women in arranged marriages. In the context of the United States, 
earnings potential tends to suppress the effect of early marriage expectation on early 
marriage. Further, it is moderated by social norms embedded in specific social contexts.  
Where social norms favor early marriage, young people with good earnings potential speed 
up to marry early. This dissertation extends the economic and ideational approaches in family 
studies by examining the interaction between economic and ideational factors on marriage 
timing in different cultural contexts. I further reexamine the assumption of conflict between 
women’s marriage timing and education pursuing in the Western, industrialized societies. 
Built upon contextually extracted hypotheses, finding suggests that women juggle marriage 
and education with the support of historic culture and local family structure and kinship 
network in Nepal.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 Marriage is a social institution that has been fundamental to societies throughout 
history. Pooling economic resources together, marriage usually provides financial securities 
to individuals living in the arrangement of this institution. Also, as a social unit, marriage is 
always under the regulation of cultural and social norms. Although both economic and 
ideational factors appear to be relevant to marriage, they can vary in how important and how 
salient they are across different cultures and societies. Further, it is possible for economic and 
ideational forces to be at odds with each other. The presence and power of both economic 
and ideational factors present many empirically intriguing questions to be answered. Take 
two kinds of societies as examples. Does money affect the timing of marriage in a society of 
universal and early marriage, considering that almost everyone marries and most people 
marry in a highly concentrated range of ages? Because marriage is universal, are personal 
attitudes still relevant to whether, when, and whom to marry? Or, turn to a society where the 
economic development level is relatively high and Western values of individualism are 
prevalent. Correspondingly, many individuals do not necessarily need to pool their economic 
resources for survival. Do economic concerns still affect marriage formation? Personal 
attitudes, aspirations, and expectations concerning marriage may be related to marriage 
formation. However, are social norms concerning marriage still relevant to marriage 
formation? Therefore, the use and integration of both the economic and ideational 
perspectives is a promising approach for further examination of the dynamics in marriage 
formation processes across a variety of settings. 
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Further, transition to marriage is related to role change from being single to being a 
spouse, daughter/son-in-law or even parents. In the Western, industrialized societies, 
literature argues that family and student roles are in conflict due to the fact that sufficient 
time and financial resources are necessary to run a house (Thornton, Axinn & Teachman, 
1995). However, in many transitional societies, especially South Asian countries, extended 
family and patrilocal living arrangements after marriage are common (Caldwell, 1982; 
Caldwell, Reddy & Caldwell, 1988). This cultural practice and family structure may affect 
the family and student role conflict hypotheses extracted from the Western context in two 
ways, especially for women. 1) Living in a big family, the daughter-in-law may have very 
demanding housework and she may also have to take whatever other jobs available to 
financially contribute to the family. 2) The parents-in-law may have financial resources to 
support their daughter-in-law to continue her education if she has not completed it. Further, 
there may also be other family members available to share household duties.      
 In the field of social demography, economic and ideational approaches are two 
prominent perspectives on family formation. The gender specialization model puts forward 
that men and women exchange their comparative advantages in the labor market and through 
household production to maximize their welfare (Becker, 1991). Women with more 
education and a good job and income thus do not need to depend on men, can buy their 
economic independence, and as a result retreat from marriage. On the contrary, the spouse 
search model argues that educated women can afford longer time to find a compatible spouse 
and that financial resources can increase the economic interdependence among the spouses 
(Oppenheimer, 1994). Thus the economic advantage of both men and women is related to 
more marriage formation. More specifically, educated women may take a longer time to find 
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a spouse, but eventually they will have higher marriage rates.     
  Ideational theories of family formation greatly enrich the understanding of the 
motivations underlying marriage formation, independent of the motivation of economic 
benefit maximization (Axinn & Thornton, 2000; Cherlin, 1992; Hochschild, 1989; Thornton, 
Axinn & Hill, 1992). Ideational factors, such as attitudes, aspirations, expectations, and 
social norms concerning marriage play important roles in the transition to marriage formation 
(Brown, 2000; Carlson, McLanahan & England, 2004; McGinnis, 2003; Waller & 
McLanahan, 2003). However, the intricate dynamics of how economic and ideational factors 
pattern family formation can be much more complicated than simply including both factors 
in regression models, as if there is no interplay between the two.  
 This dissertation extends the existing literature in the following two ways. First, it 
examines the role of both economic and ideational factors, and the interplay between the two, 
in the timing of marriage in two settings, Nepal and the United States. For this research, I 
propose a theoretical framework that combines ideas from both economic and ideational 
approaches in studies of marriage formation. It draws on economic rational choice theory, 
social psychological reasoned action theory, and sociological norm theories to examine how 
economic and ideational factors pattern decision-making concerning marriage formation, 
both independently and interactively. Second, both Becker’s and Oppenheimer’s economic 
models imply that women either forgo or postpone marriage formation due to education 
pursuits. Further, other empirical research support that student and family roles are both 
commanding and thus competing for each other (citation). However, all the above research 
has been conducted in the Western context. This dissertation thus investigates whether 
women combine student and family roles simultaneously in the cultural context of Nepal.   
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 To start, I examine marriage processes in the non-Western setting of Nepal, where 
marriage is near universal, but the average age at first marriage is rising. First, I look at how 
economic and ideational factors independently and interactively influence the timing of 
marriage. Next, I use both qualitative and quantitative data to examine women’s post-
marriage education continuation in Nepal. After that, I move to the context of the United 
States, where a retreat from marriage is argued to be occurring (Cherlin, 1992; Waite, 1995), 
and investigate how economic and ideational factors are related to early marriage. Finally, I 
discuss the limitations and strengths of this dissertation in the conclusion. In the following 
three sections, I briefly summarize each of the three papers of my dissertation.  
Economic Resources, Personal Attitudes and Subjective Norms 
The first paper of my dissertation adopts a theoretical framework that draws on economic 
rational choice theory, social psychological reasoned action theory, and sociological norm 
theories. I examine how timing of marriage is related to individuals’ socioeconomic 
attainment, their attitudes and perceived family members’ attitudes toward marriage, and the 
interactions between socioeconomic attainment and the latter two ideational factors. 
 This paper describes ways in which economic and ideational factors are 
independently and interactively associated with timing of marriage. Economic and ideational 
theories are woven together to develop setting-specific hypotheses that are tested using 
survey data from the Chitwan Valley Family Study. Findings show that both having more 
economic resources and having pro-marriage attitudes are associated with higher marriage 
rates, and there are interactions between certain economic and ideational factors, suggesting 
complicated mechanisms concerning the motivations underlying marriage formation 
processes. For women, economic factors can both increase marriage rates and help buy 
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economic independence to avoid early marriage, depending on how strong cultural and 
familial pressures are. For men, economic resources and pro-marriage cultural factors 
accelerate their transition to marriage, but under extreme cultural and familial pressure, 
economic factors have weaker effects. This paper extends the current understanding of the 
integration of economic and ideational approaches in studies of family formation behaviors.  
The Alternative Route of Nepalese Women: Continuing Schooling after Marriage 
The second paper of my dissertation use both qualitative and quantitative data to explore 
whether women continue their education after marriage and what characteristics of these 
women shape this unique family pattern. I first identify patterns emerging from the narratives 
of 20 semi-structured interviews. These findings are then woven with existing literature to 
suggest contextually relevant, alternative theoretical thoughts, and produce new hypotheses. I 
estimate logistic regression models using survey data from the Ideational Influence on 
Marriage and Fertility Behaviors (IIMFB) to test new theories and hypotheses suggested.  
My findings show that a significant number of women who had not completed their 
education before marriage continue after marriage, and women whose parents were more 
educated have higher rates of continuing their education. Furthermore, the more education 
women have before marriage, the more likely they will continue their education after 
marriage. Women who had a combined marriage are more likely to continue their education 
compared to those with a love marriage. Women who had an arranged marriage are in 
general more likely to continue their education, compared to those with a love marriage. 
However, the relationship reverses for those with university education, with more college 
women in love marriages continuing education than college women in arranged marriages.     
Economic Potential, Marriage Expectations and Social Norms  
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The third paper uses the same theoretical framework as the first chapter of my dissertation. I 
again draw on the economic rational choice approach, the social psychological reasoned 
action approach, and the sociological norms perspective. I examine how adolescents’ 
economic potential, their own marriage expectations, and social norms concerning marriage 
expectations within specific social contexts affect entry into early marriage, independently, 
and interactively. Specifically, interactions between adolescents’ economic potential and 
their own marriage expectations, between their economic potential and social norms of 
marriage expectations will be examined. Data is drawn from the National Longitudinal Study 
of Adolescent Health (Waves I and IV).  
 Results show that individuals’ academic success (indicative of higher potential 
earnings in the future) deters early marriage formation. Early marriage patterns vary by 
gender, race and ethnicity, and social class. Young adults from middle-class families tend to 
postpone marriage. I find that if individuals expect to marry early, they often do so regardless 
of socioeconomic background and demographic characteristics. Earnings potential, however, 
tends to suppress the effect of early marriage expectation on early marriage. Further, it is 
moderated by social norms embedded in specific social contexts. Where social norms favor 
early marriage, young people with good earnings potential speed up to marry early. 
Theoretically, this research contributes to the field of family studies in investigating how 
economic and non-economic motivations underlying family behaviors interact. Empirically, 
it has significant implications for understanding why economic factors tend to differently 
pattern family formation for groups distinguished by gender, race and ethnicity, and social 
class. The results suggest that the varying economic impacts across groups are likely to be 
explained by variations in social norms among the groups.  
  
CHAPTER 1 
 
HOW ECONOMIC AND IDEATIONAL FACTORS 
INTERACT TO SHAPE MARRIAGE TIMING 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Family scholars and social demographers have long used an economic perspective to 
study marriage, fertility, and other behaviors associated with family formation (Becker, 1991; 
Caldwell, 1982; Davis, 1955; Easterlin & Crimmins, 1985; Notestein, 1953; Thompson, 
1929; Willis, 1973). However, economic explanations for family formation have not always 
been satisfactory. Findings from the Princeton European Fertility Project show, for example, 
that fertility declines are not always closely associated with socioeconomic development. 
Instead, these declines occur in European countries with various levels of socioeconomic 
development and are bounded by homogeneous language and ethnicity (Coale & Watkins, 
1986; Knodel & van de Walle, 1979). Further, research using data from the World Fertility 
Survey shows that in many developing countries, changes in demographic behaviors are not 
closely associated with levels of socioeconomic development (Cleland & Hobcraft, 1985). 
Results from all the above research suggest that non-economic ideational forces are likely to 
be significant contributors to family formation and changes. Family scholars usually use 
ideation to refer to broad non-economic or non-material forces such as values, attitudes, 
beliefs, social norms, religion, and culture (Jayakody, Thornton & Axinn, 2008; Lesthaeghe, 
1983 & 1998; Lesthaeghe & Willems, 1999; Thornton, 2005; Thornton & Binstock, 2001). 
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 The focus on ideational factors as a critical force in the formation and development of 
family and demographic behaviors began in the mid-1980s. In addition to socioeconomic 
development, individualistic values, secularization, and diffusion of information and ideas 
are believed to shape and change demographic and family behaviors (Cleland & Wilson, 
1987; Coale & Watkins, 1986; Lesthaeghe, 1983; Mason, 1997; Pollak & Watkins, 1993; 
Preston, 1986; Watkins, 1996). More recently, Thornton (2005) emphasizes the role of 
developmental idealism, a set of values prioritizing modern society and family life, in 
shaping social and demographic behavior in non-western countries.  
 Some family scholars now incorporate both economic and ideational approaches in 
their work on family behaviors (Cherlin, 2005; Hirschman & Rindfuss, 1982; Lesthaeghe & 
Surkyn, 1988; Preston, 1985; Thornton, 2001). In studies where economic and ideational 
factors are jointly evaluated, they are generally conceptualized, measured, and tested as 
independent forces. It is likely that economic and ideational factors interact with each other 
to pattern family behaviors. Empirical evidence of high aspirations of marriage yet low 
marriage rates among economically disadvantaged groups in the United States suggests a 
possible interaction between the influences of ideational and economic factors on marriage 
formation; ideational factors may modify the influence of economic factors on the timing of 
marriage (Bulcroft & Bucroft, 1993; Cherlin, 2005; South, 1993). Some recent empirical 
studies include both ideational and economic factors in examining the timing of marriage 
(Carlson, McLanahan & England, 2004; Edin, 2000; Sassler & Schoen, 1999). Yet, the 
potential interactions between the two require more attention.  
 In this paper, I develop an interactive framework, which integrates both economic and 
ideational factors in the study of marriage formation, unlike much previous research in an 
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interactive fashion. The process of how socioeconomic attainment, attitudes, and subjective 
norms independently and interactively influence an individual’s decision to marry is 
examined. Using data from the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) in Nepal, discrete-time 
event history models are estimated to examine how the risk of marriage is related to an 
individual’s socioeconomic attainment and the interactions with the following ideational 
factors: his or her attitudes and subjective norms and parents’ attitudes concerning marriage. 
By examining the interactions between economic and ideational factors in shaping the timing 
of marriage, this research contributes to the broad literature that integrates economic and 
ideational approaches in family sociology and demography. The interactive framework 
contributes to the understanding of variations in family formation behaviors of individuals 
from different socioeconomic and cultural groups in both Western and non-Western contexts.   
  
SETTING 
 The setting for this research is the Chitwan Valley in Nepal. The Chitwan Valley is 
located in south-central Nepal, 100 miles southwest of the capital city of Kathmandu. The 
valley is nestled in the foothills of the Himalaya Mountains, 450 feet above sea level. Prior to 
the 1950s, the valley was a remote and isolated jungle. Assisted by the United States during 
the 1950s, the Nepalese government cleared forests, eradicated malaria, and turned jungle 
areas into farmland. In the late 1970s, the first year-round road and connecting roads from 
the Chitwan Valley to other cities in Nepal and India were constructed. At this time, 
Narayanghat, the largest city in the Chitwan Valley, became a major transportation hub in 
Nepal (Axinn & Yabiku, 2001; Yabiku, 2006). 
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 Also during the 1970s, dramatic social changes occurred that transformed the 
organization of people’s lives; services previously provided within the family (e.g., 
transportation, employment, and health care) began to be outsourced to nonfamily 
institutions. For the first time, individuals participated in nonfamily experiences such as 
schooling, nonfamily living, nonfamily employment, going to the cinema, and being exposed 
to mass media. These new social institutions and experiences helped to shape changes in 
individuals’ family behaviors including fertility and marriage through both economic and 
ideational mechanisms, such as increased job opportunities and income, and exposure to 
mass media conveying Western values regarding family behaviors (Axinn & Yabiku, 2001; 
Yabiku, 2004, 2005 & 2006). In spite of striking social changes, the historical Nepalese 
family values and systems prevailed and marriage was the universal norm. The average age 
at first marriage in the Chitwan Valley was 17.6 years for females and 21.9 for males 
between 1990 and 1996 (Yabiku, 2005). However, changes relevant to family behaviors were 
evident.  
 During the transition from the 1970s to the present, parental authority lessened, and 
individuals gained increased autonomy and economic independence (Thornton & Fricke, 
1987; Thornton & Lin, 1994). Barber (2001) finds that the emergence of nonfamily 
institutions cultivated more individualistic attitudes toward marriage. Her findings show that 
decision-making regarding marriage, previously controlled mostly by parents, is now shifting 
to a process that allows individuals more control.  
 With increased autonomy and economic independence, individuals can be more likely 
to make decisions concerning marriage in a more individual and utilitarian way. They may 
balance what they have to gain and lose when making decisions regarding marriage (Becker, 
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1991). In Chitwan, Nepal, individuals’ level of educational achievement and employment is 
found to be associated with their choice of a spouse in relation to parental arrangement for 
marriage: With higher level of educational achievement or employment experience, 
individuals are more likely to choose their spouses rather than have the parents arrange the 
marriage (Ghimire et al., 2006). However, because of a long history of religious and social 
norms encouraging arranged marriages, individuals are still willing to allow parents some 
control over the marriage process (Barber, 2004; Ghimire et al., 2006). Individuals’ attitudes, 
their perception of their parents’ attitudes, and their parents’ attitudes can all be important 
regarding marriage decisions in this setting. Thus, this set of factors provides rich fodder to 
examine the complicated interactions between economic and ideational forces in regards to 
marriage formation.   
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 This research combines ideas from economics, social psychology, and sociology to 
examine how economic and ideational factors shape individuals’ decisions concerning 
marriage formation. The economic approach of rational choice is restricted to an isolated 
individual who balances costs and benefits to maximize utility (Becker, 1991). In contrast to 
the individualistic approach of rational choice, the social psychological approach of reasoned 
action theory considers both personal attitudes and subjective norms influenced by 
significant others, such as family members, friends, and neighbors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). A sociological perspective regarding social norms emphasizes an 
understanding of behaviors regulated by social norms in relevant social contexts. Each 
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approach may partially explain the dynamics underlying individuals’ decision-making 
regarding marriage formation. This paper, thereby, asks whether the motivations underlying 
individuals’ decisions regarding marriage are rational, reasoned, driven by social norms, or a 
combination of all of these.   
Costs and Benefits Calculation: Rational Choice?  
 Gary Becker’s (1991) New Home Economics approach applies an individualistic 
rational choice perspective to the area of family including marriage, divorce, and fertility as 
well as relationships among family members. Linking activities at the micro-economic 
(individual) level to trends at the macro (societal) level, the approach assumes that 
individuals are forward-looking, consistent in their behaviors, and act to maximize their 
welfare. According to Becker (1991), individuals are not however, completely free in their 
behaviors; their actions are restricted by limited resources. Lack of information or 
opportunities can also restrict individuals’ decision-making. Time is a finite resource running 
throughout the life course. As the provision of goods on the market increases, time becomes 
more valuable when individuals are faced with increased choices during the limited life span. 
Thus, individuals balance the costs and benefits of their choices regarding the attainment of 
certain goals.  
 The rational choice approach, applied to family formation, posits that in marriage, 
men and women exchange their respective comparative advantages in the labor market and 
household work, thus maximizing both their individual and collective welfare (Becker, 
1991). Following this logic, men’s economic resources, such as employment, income, and 
education, are predicted to be positively associated with marriage rates; women’s economic 
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resources are predicted to be negatively associated with marriage rates, considering that 
women’s economic independence reduces what they can gain from marriage based on 
exchange through the marriage bond (Becker, 1991; Moffitt, 2000; Teachman, Polonko & 
Leigh, 1987; Trent & South, 1989). 
Past research supports the positive effects of men’s employment, income, and 
schooling on marriage formation (Goldscheider & Waite, 1986; Lichter et al., 1992; Marini, 
1980; Marini & Fan, 1997; Oppenheimer, 2000; Rosenfeld, 1980; Rosenfeld & Kalleberg, 
1990). In the setting of Nepal, numerous studies also identify positive effects of employment 
and educational attainment on marriage formation for men (Niraula, 1994; Yabiku, 2004, 
2005 and 2006a). Becker’s (1991) individualistic economic approach, thus, can be used to 
predict the same pattern of association between economic resources and marriage timing for 
men in the Chitwan Valley. 
 Compared to research on men, research on women’s economic resources provides 
mixed findings. Some research suggests negative effects of women’s economic resources on 
marriage formation (Martin, 1995; Singh & Samara, 1996). Others find no effect of women’s 
economic resources on marriage formation (Manning & Smock, 1995; Xie et al., 2003). Still 
others confirm the positive effects of women’s education and employment on marriage 
formation (Bloom & Bennett, 1990; Goldscheider & Waite, 1986; Goldstein & Kenney, 
2001; Lichter et al., 1992; Oppenheimer, 1994). In the setting of Nepal, Axinn (1992) reports 
that husband’s employment increases the use of fertility limitation while wife’s has no effect 
for an ethnic minority group in rural Nepal. In regards to marriage formation, some find 
education and employment to have positive effects and others find negative effects (Aryal, 
2006; Niraula, 1994; Yabiku, 2004, 2005 & 2006b).  
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The reported negative association between timing of marriage and economic 
resources for women is likely due to a temporal conflict between time invested in human 
capital accumulation and the normative timing of marriage. Sweeney (2002) finds that for 
younger cohorts of women, education has a positive effect on marriage; for older cohorts of 
women, the effect appears to be negative. This change in the effect of education is likely 
because for older cohorts of women, high educational attainment may have meant they were 
in school past the normative age of marriage and were therefore less likely to find a partner, 
but women from younger cohorts were able to complete their education before the normative 
age for marriage, which is sufficiently postponed, compared to that to old cohorts. 
Goldscheider and Waite (1986) confirm education effects to be sensitive to the timing of 
marriage. Although school enrollment may have the effect of postponing marriage due to the 
conflict between student and family roles (Tambashe & Shapiro, 1996; Thornton, Axinn & 
Teachman, 1995; Yabiku, 2006), after schooling is completed, marriage rates eventually 
increase.  
 This study argues that on average, educational attainment does not necessary deter 
marriage formation for women in the Chitwan Valley. There are two scenarios where there 
could be no conflict between marriage timing and time invested in education and in 
preparation form employment for women. Marriage timing may be positively associated with 
economic factors for women if the normative timing of marriage for women is sufficiently 
postponed or if women do not normatively invest long years in education. Women in the 
Chitwan Valley have an average of 4.7 years of education, and are on average 17.6 years old 
at first marriage (Yabiku, 2005). Therefore, the second scenario applies to women in the 
Chitwan Valley.     
 15 
 
 However, does the rational choice approach work inNepal, a country in transition 
from a family-centric status quo to a society more largely organized by forces beyond the 
family? During this transitory period, individuals have more autonomy, agency, and 
economic independence (Thornton & Fricke, 1987; Thornton & Lin, 1994). Their increased 
agency and economic independence likely provide increased flexibility to make decisions 
concerning marriage based on their economic benefits rather than out of obligation to their 
parents. Yabiku’s (2006) research in the Chitwan Valley further implies that changes in 
economic potential are related to the timing of marriage. In this setting, the two individual-
level socioeconomic factors I expect to be most related to the timing of marriage are 
nonfamily employment and educational attainment; these two prominent opportunities 
relevant to income are among the many dramatic social changes that have occurred in recent 
decades.  
 This paper hypothesizes that for both men and women, higher education and having 
employment experiences are regarded as economically attractive traits in the marriage 
market, and will facilitate an individual’s earlier movement to marriage. However, 
enrollment in school is usually in conflict with the family role (Thornton et al., 1995; Yabiku, 
2006), and is likely to have a negative effect on marriage timing in the Chitwan Valley.  
Individual Attitudes and Subjective Norms: Reasoned Action? 
 Rational choice theory is criticized for its purely economic perspective, or as some 
say, comparing “having a baby” to “buying a car” (Blake, 1968; Hirschman, 1994). Aside 
from economic benefits pursuing, attitudes and social norms are also theorized to be 
important factors that influence the complicated decision-making process (Blake, 1968). 
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Some have argued that whether individuals adopt the economic benefits maximization 
approach depends on their attitudes toward the socially acceptable thing to in their social 
roles (March, 1994; Montgomery, 1998). Thus, for complicated processes such as marriage 
timing, it seems essential to consider attitudes and other ideational factors in addition to 
economic calculations or rational choice.    
 Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) theory of reasoned action 
argues that individuals’ behavior is determined by their intention to conduct a certain 
behavior, such as marriage. According to the reasoned action theory, individuals’ intention to 
marry young is a function of their attitudes and subjective norms. Individuals’ attitude 
determines the evaluation of the potential outcome. Their subjective norm is the perception 
of family and friends’ acceptance of their behavior. The term subjective norm, used in this 
context, embeds individuals in the social context of significant others, which is in contrast to 
Becker’s (1991) focus on isolated individuals. In addition to economic calculations, attitudes 
and subjective norms, such as perceptions of parents’ and neighbors’ attitudes, and social 
norms can have an independent effect on family formation (Aryal, 2006; Axinn, Clarkberg & 
Thornton, 1994; Barber & Axinn, 1998a; Barber & Axinn, 1998b; Yabiku 2006b). It is worth 
noting here that attitudes can be relevant to both economic and noneconomic concerns, while 
subjective norms, embedding individuals in a social context, may reflect more of the non-
economic motivations underlying decision-making.  
 Empirical research also confirms that positive attitudes toward marriage can increase 
marriage rates (Carlson et al., 2004; Harknett & McLanahan, 2004; Sassler & Schoen, 1999). 
Corresponding to the reasoned action perspective, it is likely that attitudes and subjective 
norms shape marriage formation, independent of one’s socioeconomic attainment. In the 
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setting of the Chitwan Valley, marriage is nearly universal, and age at first marriage is young 
(Yabiku, 2005). Although individual autonomy has increased, some are still willing to defer 
to local culture and familial authority (Barber, 2001). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
relevant attitudes and subjective norms to be closely associated with marriage timing in the 
setting of the Chitwan Valley, including attitudes concerning ideal marriage age, the timing 
of marriage in relation to menstruation, and the perception of mother’s attitude concerning 
the importance of marriage. In Chitwan, Nepal, individuals are still willing to allow parental 
control over their marriage formation (Barber, 2001), and this is testament to the relevance of 
parental attitudes. I hypothesize that, independent of socioeconomic attainment, those who 
have, and whose parents have, more favorable attitudes and subjective norms concerning 
marriage will marry sooner.   
An Interactive Approach—Economic Versus Non-Economic Motivation Interaction 
 Combining rational choice theory, reasoned action theory, and the social norm 
perspective, this study proposes an interactive framework. It argues that individuals’ 
decision-making process regarding family behaviors involves not only economic 
consideration, but also relatively non-economic concerns, such as attitudes, subjective norms, 
and social norms. It is likely that economic calculations and non-economic motivations shape 
family behaviors, both independently and interactively. 
Theory and evidence from previous studies suggest that both ideational influences 
and economic calculations shape decision-making regarding marriage. The extension of 
rational choice theory via role theory and the social norm perspective appears to help further 
synthesize the two approaches (March, 1994; Montgomery, 1998). Individuals correspond to 
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their roles by either following “the logic of appropriateness” toward a social norm obedience 
behavior, or by following “the logic of consequences” toward an economic benefit pursuing 
behavior. For example, a friend is obligated to cooperate consistently with the expectation 
that reaping profits from friends is not socially appropriate. However, a business person is 
motivated to maximize economic benefits because profit pursuing is expected from someone 
in that role (Montgomery, 1998). These examples show that individuals tend to follow what 
they deem as socially acceptable in different social contexts. This is consistent with the idea 
of social norm obedience: A social norm compliant person (non-rational actor) chooses to 
behave appropriately in specific social contexts for social approval instead of pursuing utility 
maximization (Bourdieu, 1977). 
 Therefore, whether an individual makes the rational choice to maximize his or her 
own welfare depends on the attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived social norms 
regarding what is acceptable in the specific context. That is to say, an individual takes into 
account both economic and noneconomic concerns when faced with various real-life 
situations. The subjective norm and social norm perspectives contribute to the understanding 
of ideational factors in that the dynamics of individual attitudes and subjective norms should 
always be interpreted in the social context.  
  For example, when making a decision regarding marriage formation in Chitwan 
Valley, Nepal, sons and daughters may factor in their mothers’ feelings about the importance 
of getting married. If they do not value their mothers’ opinions, economic calculations might 
be more salient and have stronger effects on marriage formation for these people. In contrast, 
if they regard getting married as very important to their mothers, they may consider the 
economic benefits associated with marriage timing as secondary. Here, economic concerns 
 19 
 
can be both consistent and in conflict with mother’s opinion regarding importance of 
marriage. If the economic concerns are consistent with mothers’ opinion, economic factors 
can have stronger effects. However, if the economic concerns are in conflict with mothers’ 
opinion, economic factors can have weaker or no effects on marriage formation. Therefore, 
economic calculation and subjective norms can interactively pattern marriage timing. The 
interaction can also apply to individuals’ and their parents attitudes regarding marriage with 
economic factors.  
 The possible interactions between economic and ideational factors are also suggested 
by a body of empirical research. Greenman and Xie’s (2008) study on the effects of gender 
and race/ethnicity on income inequality shows that cultural differences across race/ethnicity 
help explain variations in the gender income penalty for White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian 
women in the United States. Although their study focuses on variations in the gender income 
penalty explained by cultural differences, it is likely that individual socioeconomic 
attainment shapes the timing of marriage differently if individuals have different attitudes 
and subjective norms concerning marriage. In general, past empirical studies about marriage 
have found that most adults expect to marry, and that there is little variation in social groups 
from different socioeconomic backgrounds (Bulcroft & Bucroft, 1993; Cherlin, 2005; South, 
1993). However, economically affluent people are much more likely to marry than their less 
affluent counterparts, although both groups hold similarly positive feelings about marriage. 
The implication is that an individual with positive attitudes toward marriage may be more 
likely to get married on the condition that he/she acquires sufficient economic resources to 
make marriage affordable. Bulcroft and Bulcroft (1993) suggest that for many individuals 
who have positive attitudes toward marriage have not got married because they have not 
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found a “financially ready” partner. This further suggests the likelihood of interactions 
between economic and ideational factors with respect to marriage formation.  
 Hirschman and Rindfuss (1982) find that socioeconomic traits, such as urban/rural 
origin and education and various cultural factors, contributed to variations in the order and 
timing of family formation events among five different populations in four Asian countries 
and regions. Furthermore, the Chinese preference for male children may explain the 
expedited first birth after marriage among highly educated Chinese women from both Taiwan 
and Malaysia compared to other highly educated women from Korea, Thailand, and 
Malaysia. Their finding suggests that the education effect on the timing of first birth after 
marriage is conditional on culture. A similar pattern is likely to apply to marriage timing; 
socioeconomic attainment can shape marriage formation, depending on ideational factors 
such as an individual’s attitudes and subjective norms toward marriage. 
Based on the above research, this interactive approach argues that social norms and 
culture provide a platform on which economic calculations (primarily economic concerns) 
operate. That is to say, social norms can help define acceptable ways to pursue economic 
benefits. For example, when a male-breadwinner family is the social norm, individuals likely 
pursue economic benefits by forming this kind of family, which emphasizes on men’s market 
competency and women’s household production. However, when ideational changes occur so 
that society is more accepting of the dual-breadwinner family, individuals may choose this 
family mode to gain best benefits, which emphasizes on both men and women’s economic 
potential or resources. Depending on their personal attitudes, subjective norms, and social 
norms regarding what they believe in are the socially acceptable and ideal family pattern, 
they will conform to either the male-breadwinner or the dual-breadwinner model. It is 
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necessary to note that the motivation of economic-benefit maximization is not always in 
conflict with obedience to social norms. Individuals driven by either economic or non-
economic motivation balance the two in different social contexts. Therefore, economic 
concerns can interact with motivations to obey social norms, depending on how strongly 
individuals hold their personal attitudes and subjective norms relevant to certain social 
norms.   
The contribution of this interactive framework, compared to the rational choice 
approach, lies in its emphasis on both economic and non-economic motivations (social norm 
obedience if it does not involve economic benefit maximization). Furthermore, the two are 
believed to interact in the real decision-making process. In reality, it is difficult to separate 
economic concerns from noneconomic concerns in individuals’ decision-making processes. 
Attitudes can include both monetary and nonmonetary concerns. Social norms can regulate 
both economic calculations and noneconomic considerations.  
This research does not directly measure either economic or noneconomic motivations. 
Rather, the focus is to examine the interaction among the commonly used socioeconomic 
indicators and some contextually relevant ideational indicators regarding marriage formation. 
Ultimately, the results will contribute to understanding the entangled economic and 
noneconomic motivations underlying family behaviors and help to improve the theoretical 
framework guiding the study of family formation behaviors.  
 Thus, this study presents analyses that examine how socioeconomic attainment and 
various attitudes and subjective norms about marriage interactively shape the timing of 
marriage in Nepal’s Chitwan Valley. I hypothesize that individuals with higher 
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socioeconomic attainment, such as more education or having employment experience, are 
more likely to marry earlier than their less affluent counterparts. At the same time, I expect 
that individuals’ preference or parental preference (or perceived parental preference) for 
early marriage is related to earlier marriage. Furthermore, I expect that the effects of 
socioeconomic attainment on marriage formation are conditional on the effects of attitudes 
and subjective norms toward marriage formation.  
 
DATA AND METHOD 
Data 
 Survey data from the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) is used for the analyses. I 
use data from the 1996 Individual Survey and 126 months of the monthly Household 
Demographic Registry collected from 1997 throug 2007. Using a systematic probability 
sample, the CVFS examined social changes and family behavior for 5,721 individuals living 
in 171 neighborhoods with a response rate of 97 percent. In this study, a neighborhood is 
defined as a geographic cluster of 5-15 households. The CVFS employs a life history 
calendar method to measure individual-level data (Axinn, Pearce & Ghimire, 1999). 
Interviews were conducted for each resident of ages 15-59, and their spouses in all 171 
neighborhoods. The sample for my analyses is limited to 809 individuals who, in 1996, were 
unmarried and aged 15-20, following Yabiku’s strategy in his 2006 study to limit the sample 
to a young cohort. The analytic sample is limited to a young cohort of men and women for 
two reasons: (a) Age at first marriage in Nepal is quite young, and (b) the inclusion of never-
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married individuals older than 20 in 1996, who are quite unusual in this setting, would bias 
the sample to unusual cases with unobserved heterogeneity (Yabiku, 2006a).   
Dependent Variable  
 The outcome of interest is marriage timing. Individuals are coded as 0 if they were 
not married during the 126-month observation period beginning in 1996. If they were not 
married by the end of the observation period, their values remain 0 and become right 
censored. If they married during any month, they are coded 1 in that month and no longer 
contribute to the subsequent person-month risk. Because time is precise to the month, I use 
discrete-time hazard models to examine the risk of getting married every month. The person-
period risk is therefore person-month.  
Independent Variables 
Socioeconomic Attainment. I use work1 and education to measure socioeconomic attainment. 
Work is defined as holding a salaried job, wage labor, a position in a family-owned business, 
or military service. If individuals were engaged in any of these work situations before 1996, a 
dichotomous variable for work is coded as 1; otherwise it is coded as 0. Two measures of 
education are used: school enrollment in 1996 and highest year of schooling in 1996.  The 
CVFS Individual Survey data only include educational information through 1996; the 
monthly household registry that collected family formation information after 1996 does not 
have any information related to education. Past research shows accumulated years of 
schooling in the Chitwan Valley to be relatively low; on average, 7.5 years for males and 4.7 
years for females (Yabiku, 2005). As shown in Table 1, average year of schooling is less than 
7 for women and less than 8 for men. Because a significant number of respondents were still 
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enrolled in school in 1996 and had not yet completed their educations, I use highest year of 
schooling in 1996 to approximate the completion of education, while controlling for school 
enrollment.2 School enrollment was coded 1 for those who were enrolled in 1996 and 
otherwise 0.   
Individual Attitudes and Subjective Norms. I use two indicators to measure individual 
attitudes regarding marriage. The first indicator measures the ideal age for marriage, 
constructed from two questions: What do you feel is the ideal age for a man to get married 
these days? and What do you feel is the ideal age for a woman to get married these days? I 
first calculate the ideal marriage age for each individual by assigning the value for the ideal 
age for a man and the value for the ideal age for a woman to the corresponding gender. To 
capture the dynamics of time, I construct a time-varying variable: reached the ideal age for 
marriage. Those who had not yet reached their ideal age for marriage during the observation 
months are coded as 0; those who had reached or passed their ideal age for marriage are 
coded as 1. The second indicator measures individuals’ attitude concerning the timing of 
marriage relative to menstruation. This was constructed from the survey item: A girl should 
be married before her first menstruation. Respondents were asked whether they strongly 
agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the statement. The response categories 
are coded so that a higher value indicates more agreement with a girl needing to marry before 
menstruation.  
The subjective norm is measured using a question about individuals’ perception of the 
importance that the mother placed on marriage: How important do you think it is to your 
mother that you get married soon? Would you say very important, somewhat important, or 
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not important at all? The responses are coded so that a higher value indicates a higher 
perception of importance to the mother. 
To further capture the dynamics of non-economic motivations in this context where 
parents still maintain control over their children (Barber, 2004; Ghimire et al., 2006), I also 
create two variables measuring parental attitudes. One is based on these survey questions: 
What do you feel is the ideal age for a man to get married these days? and What do you feel 
is the ideal age for a woman to get married these days? The other is on the survey item: A 
girl should be married before her first menstruation. Because the 1996 CVFS collected data 
from everyone with ages of 15-59 in the household, I am able to create measures for parents. 
The construction of the variables for parents is similar to the variables for respondents based 
on the same questions. For these measures, one issue merits noting. Not all individuals lived 
with their parents, and as a result, there are a number of missing values for parents’ beliefs 
about ideal marriage age and about marriage relative to the onset of menstruation. Therefore, 
special caution is needed when interpreting parental attitude measures. The results of 
statistical models involving parental measures are only representative of those who lived with 
their parents in 1996. The parental measures help explain how different ideational factors 
contribute to marriage formation in the unique social context of Chitwan, Nepal.  
Control Variables. The analysis controls for time, age, migration status, marriage month, 
caste/ethnicity, family socioeconomic status (SES), and mother’s number of children. To 
better control gender effects, I split the sample by gender and estimate corresponding models 
for men and women, separately. Time is measured in months, which collapses the risk 
exposure to marrying into monthly units. Gender is coded as 1 for females and as 0 for 
males. Age is measured in years. Migration status is measured by two variables. One variable 
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measures whether the respondent had ever migrated by 1996. The other measure3 is a time-
varying variable, lagged for a month, indicating whether the respondent had ever migrated 
since 1996. In the Nepali culture, there are popular marriage months and less popular ones 
(Yabiku, 2006). I create dummy variables for each month of the year4. Caste/ethnicity 
includes five categories: High-caste Hindu, Low-caste Hindu, Newar, Hill Tibeto-Burmese, 
and Terai Tibeto-Burmese.  
Family SES is measured using three variables: family economic resources (FER), 
whether father ever had work experience, and father’s highest year of schooling. Six 
variables are used to measure FER: household quality, household possessions, owning wet 
land, amount of wet land, owning dry land, and amount of dry land. House quality is a scale 
measuring the quality of the house, including number of stories, wall, roof, and floor 
materials. The measure for household possessions is a scale measuring the amount of 
household consumption items such as televisions, radios, bikes, and farm tools. For analytic 
convenience, principle component analysis is used to reduce the number of (FER) variables. 
Number of children measures how many children the respondent’s mother had given birth to. 
Analytic Strategy 
Model Building. Event history analysis is used to analyze the data. Because time is precise to 
the month, I use discrete-time hazard models to examine the influence of covariates on the 
risk of marrying. Each individual had multiple cases of time (month) until the event of 
marriage occurred, except those who married in the first month. The hazard model used to 
estimate the monthly risk of getting married is:  
  Log (p/1-p) = β0+Xkβk, 
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where X is the vector of explanatory variables, and β is the vector of parameters of the 
explanatory variables. The analysis unit is person-months. By exponentiating β, the result 
represents an odds ratio, which approximates the probability of those getting married versus 
the probability of those not yet married. The odds ratio estimated by the discrete-time hazard 
model is equivalent to the hazard in the event history analysis: a hazard equal to1 represents 
no effect, less than 1 represents a negative effect, and greater than 1 represents a positive 
effect on marriage timing. The models examine the main effects of economic indicators, 
attitudes, and subjective norms concerning marriage. Also included is an analysis of the 
interaction effects between economic and ideational factors. 
 One feature of the CVFS design is that individuals are clustered within 
neighborhoods. Inflated standard errors are a prominent issue (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). I 
use Proc GENMOD with SAS 9.1 to estimate the discrete-time hazard models5. The models 
estimate the correlations among all the neighborhoods and correct the possibly inflated 
standard errors. 
 
RESULTS 
 Descriptive statistics for men and women are reported in Table 1.1. During the 126 
months observation period of 1997 through 2007, 88% of the female respondents and 72% of 
male respondents got married. In the setting of Nepal, men tend to marry younger women 
and tend to marry later than women. Men probably have to establish themselves financially 
before family formation. Half of the men and women had worked by 1996. The average 
highest year of schooling by 1996 was slightly less than 7 for women and slightly less than 8 
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for men. However, the similar numbers could have different stories: Many women might 
have completed or be close to completing their educations, while a certain number of men 
might still have a long way to go before finishing their educations because men usually have 
more years of education than women (Yabiku, 2005). About 70% men and women were still 
enrolled in school in 1996. By the end of the observation, 52% of women and 43% of men 
had reached their reported ideal marriage ages, while 60% of women and 31% of men had 
reached their parents’ reported ideal marriage ages. 
 Combining with the gender disparity in marriage rates by the end of the observation, 
the indication is that men not only marry later than women, but this practice could be 
influenced by certain cultural beliefs and social norms. There also seems to be a gendered 
pattern in attitudes towards the cultural belief that girls should marry before menarche. 
Women were almost twice as likely as men to strongly disagree (11% women and 6% men) 
with cultural belief, while they were same likely to strongly agree with it (around 7.5% for 
both women and men). The average score of parents’ answers concerning the cultural belief 
was about 2.5 for both male and female respondents, falling between disagree and agree, but 
closer to agree. Concerning the importance for the respondents getting married for the 
mothers, about 57% of women and 47% of men answered not important at all, and about 9% 
of women and 15% of men answered very important.  
  For the control variables, the average age of men and women was about 17 in 1996, 
with women slightly younger than men. High-caste Hindus made up the majority of men and 
women (about 53% and 57%). Slightly more than a fourth of the women and slightly less 
than a third of the men had ever migrated from their birth neighborhood by 1996. However, 
88% of women and 59% of men had ever left their 1996 neighborhood by the end of the 
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observation time. The figures after 1996 indicate a gendered migration pattern: Women 
usually move in with their husbands’ families after marriage which is supported by the 
coincidence of 88% of women getting married and 88% of women leaving their 1996 
neighborhoods by the end of the observation period. However, men’s migration is more 
likely work related, such as moving to Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries to make 
money before returning home to marry. In regards to monthly distribution of marriage 
timing, men and women were more likely to get married in February, March, May and July, 
with July being the peak month of marriage (about 21% women and 34% men). The average 
scores of family economic resources were 0.38, 0.14, and 0.26 for women and 0.36, 0.18, and 
0.26 for women, based on components 1 through 3, respectively (see Table 1 for range). 
Slightly less than half of the women’s fathers and 61% of the men’s fathers had worked. The 
average year of schooling of respondents’ fathers was slightly less than 4 years for women 
and slightly more than 4 years for men. The average number of children that respondents’ 
mothers had birthed was slightly more than 5 for women and fewer than 5 for men.    
 Table 1.2 presents the multivariate analyses examining effects of economic and 
ideational measures for women. Models 1 through 7 separately examine effects of each 
socioeconomic measure, including employment and education, and each ideational measure, 
including attitudes and subjective norms of individuals and attitudes of their parents. Model 8 
is the full model including all economic and ideational measures. Each model estimates all 
control variables: time, age, caste/ethnicity, migration before and after 1996, marriage month, 
family economic resources, whether father had worked, father’s highest year of schooling, 
and mother's number of children. The results reported are odds ratios.  
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In contrast to my hypothesis, Model 1 shows no direct effect of employment on 
marriage formation for women. However, the later interaction models show that employment 
can have positive, negative, or no effects, depending on various ideational factors. In Model 
2, years of education is positively related to marriage formation while enrollment in school 
has a negative effect for women. A woman with 7 years of education is estimated to have a 
marriage hazard about 50% higher than that of a woman with no education. School 
enrollment decreased marriage rates by 33%. Surprisingly, in Model 3 the time-varying 
variable, whether an individual had reached ideal marriage age did not have a direct effect on 
marriage timing. However, the later interaction models show that the lack of direct effects for 
this ideational variable is due to interaction with employment and educational attainment. 
Model 4 examines the attitude toward the cultural belief that girls should marry before 
menarche. All the respondents had lower marriage hazards (34% lower for the strongly 
disagreed, 42% lower for the disagreed, and 55% lower for the agreed) than those who 
strongly agreed with the cultural belief. Models 5 and 6 show no direct effects for the 
importance that individuals place on the mothers’ beliefs toward marriage and parental 
attitudes regarding ideal marriage age. Surprisingly, Model 7 shows that, the more the 
parents support the cultural belief regarding girls marrying before menarche, the lower the 
women’s marriage hazards. A possible explanation is that maybe the young women think that 
this cultural belief is outdated and no longer relevant. Therefore, the more parents stick to the 
culture, the more the daughters rebel to them.   
Model 8 is the full model. Compared to Models 1 through 7, all the independent 
variables remain similar effects, except that parental attitudes towards girls marrying before 
menarche is no longer significant. All three ideational measures relevant to parents, either 
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parental attitudes or respondents’ perceptions of their mothers’ opinions regarding 
importance of marriage, have no direct effect on women. For the control variables, Terai 
Tibeto-Burmese had marriage hazards 43% lower than that of High-caste Hindus, which is 
consistent with the previous research (Niraula, 1994). Those who had ever migrated before 
1996 had marriage hazards 65% higher than those who had not migrated, while migration 
after 1996 does not show much of an effect. The possible explanation is that migration during 
younger years likely exposes the respondents and their families to more people and helps 
build more connections. It thus increases these women’s marriage hazards. However, 
migration after 1996 probably captures mostly the moving of wives to their husbands’ 
families after marriage. One component of family economic resources (using Component 
Principle Analysis) is shown to deter marriage formation. It is likely that women from rich 
families can use the family economic resources to leverage the pressure from the historical 
early marriage pattern in Nepal.   
Table 1.3 examines men’s marriage formation, estimating the same variables as Table 
1.2. Model 1 shows significant and positive effects of employment. Those who had worked 
had about 1.6 times the marriage hazards of those who had not. Surprisingly, in Model 2 both 
years of education and school enrollment show negative effects on marriage formation for 
men. A possible explanation is that many men in this sample had not yet completed their 
educations by 1996. Further, men have a long way to go to establish themselves financially 
after completing their educations. Therefore, educational attainment may deter marriage 
formation for men initially. However, eventually, it will increase marriage rates for men. In a 
later interaction model (Model 8, Table 1.4) educational attainment has a positive effect on 
marriage formation, depending on parents’ attitudes regarding girls marrying before 
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menarche. Model 3 shows no direct effect on marriage formation for whether individuals had 
reached the ideal marriage age. In Model 4, in response to the survey question regarding girls 
marrying before menarche, men who strongly disagreed with the cultural belief had 64% 
lower marriage hazards and men who disagreed had 29% lower hazards than men who 
strongly agreed. Model 5 also shows a significant effect of the subjective norm regarding 
marriage importance to one’s mother. Those who deemed it as not important at all had 
marriage rates 50% lower and those who regarded it as somewhat important had hazards 75% 
lower than those who deemed it as very important. Surprisingly, Model 6 shows those who 
had reached their parents’ ideal marriage age had marriage hazards 27% lower than that of 
others who had not. There are two possibilities here. Either, these men are rebelling to their 
parents. Or, usually parents expect their children to marry early while men have to wait for 
long time to financially establish them. Model 7 does not show direct effects for parental 
attitudes towards girls marrying before menarche, although later interaction models (Models 
7 and 8, Table 4) show interactions of the above parental attitudes with both employment and 
educational attainment.  
Model 8 jointly estimates all the above variables and control variables. Reaching the 
ideal marriage age now has a significant effect. Those who had reached their ideal marriage 
age had marriage rates about a fourth higher than that of those who had not. The attitude 
regarding girls marrying before menarche has a weaker effect after including all the other 
variables. For the control variables, age is positively associated with marriage formation for 
men. This is different from women. Again, it indicates that men tend to marry late until more 
or less financially established. Migration after 1996 doubled men’s marriage rates. This is in 
sharp contrast to women. Men’s migration at older ages can be associated with moving to 
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areas with more and better employment and income opportunities. For example, many young 
Nepalese men go to Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries to make money before 
returning to marry in Nepal. Father’s years of education tends to deter men’s marriage 
formation. For example, a man whose father has 4 years of education has a marriage hazard 
one fourth lower than that of a man whose father has no education. Some research suggests 
that father’s education serves as an ideational influence during the childhood time on adult 
family formation behaviors (Axinn & Yabiku, 2001). Mother’s number of children is 
associated with a decrease in marriage hazards. In Nepal, the couple usually lives with the 
husband’s parents after marriage, and sons usually inherit most of parents’ property. The 
number of a man’s siblings, especially brothers, thus might affect a man’s economic 
attractiveness on the marriage market6. Therefore, to examine the effect of family economic 
resources on men’s marriage formation, it is important to control for number of siblings or 
brothers.  
 Table 1.4 presents all significant interaction effects between economic and ideational 
measures, as reported in Models 1 through 3 for women and in Models 4 through 8 for men. 
Models 1 and 2 show that the effect on marriage timing of whether a woman had work 
depends on whether she had reached the ideal marriage age and her attitude regarding girls 
marrying before menarche. In Model 3, there is a significant interaction between years of 
education and whether a woman had reached the ideal marriage age on marriage formation 
for women. Models 4 through 7 show significant interactions between employment and the 
following various ideational factors on marriage formation for men: a man’s attitude 
regarding girls marrying before menarche, his subjective norm concerning marriage 
importance to his mother, whether a man had reached his parents’ ideal marriage age, and 
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parental attitudes towards girls marrying before menarche. Model 8 demonstrates a 
significant interaction between years of education and parental attitudes towards girls 
marrying before menarche.   
Figures 1.1 through 1.8 provide graphic presentations of odds ratio results of the 7 
interaction models in Table 1.4. It is clear from Figure 1 that for women who had reached the 
ideal marriage age, employment has a strong positive effect on marriage formation. 
However, for women who had not reached the ideal marriage age, employment has a 
moderately negative effect. It is likely that women who had reached ideal marriage age are 
under the cultural pressure to get married soon. If they also had some employment 
experience, they are probably regarded as economically attractive candidates by men looking 
for wives. Therefore, with the pressure from culture and attractive traits with respect to 
economic concerns to men, these women are more likely to marry early than their 
counterparts without work experience. However, it is a different story for women who had 
not reached the ideal marriage age. First, these women are not under great cultural pressure 
to marry soon. Further, without much cultural pressure, women with employment experience 
may have some economic leverage to counter the historical early marriage pattern in Nepal, 
as compared to their counterparts without employment experience. Therefore, economic 
factors can have both positive and negative effects on marriage formation for women, when 
interacting with certain ideational factors.  
In Figure 1.2, employment has a negative effect on marriage formation for women 
who strongly disagreed with and women who agreed with the cultural belief regarding girls 
marrying before menarche. In contrast, it has a positive effect for women with moderate 
attitudes towards this cultural belief. Again, it is likely that for women who strongly 
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disagreed with the cultural belief, employment experience gives them economic leverage to 
avoid the historical Nepalese early marriage pattern. For women who were moderate 
(disagreed and agreed) when it comes to this cultural belief, employment experience, which 
is regarded as economic attractiveness on the marriage market may facilitate their entering 
marriage earlier. For women who strongly agreed with this cultural belief, those without 
employment experience may recognize their economic disadvantage on the marriage market, 
and thus actively search out marriage partners, not waiting long for ideal candidates. 
Therefore, the seemingly negative effect of employment for these women is actually the 
result of the strong effect of cultural pressure. Figure 1.3 demonstrates that for women who 
had reached the ideal marriage age, education does not have an effect on marriage formation, 
while for women who had not reached the ideal marriage age, education is positively 
associated with marriage formation. Again, for women having reached the ideal marriage 
age, cultural pressure is the prominent motivation and pushes them to marry at earlier ages, 
not leaving much room for economic calculation. For women who had not reached the ideal 
marriage age, without much cultural pressure, economic calculation is the more prominent 
force influencing women to marry earlier.  
Figure 1.4 illustrates that employment does not have an effect on marriage formation 
for men who strongly disagreed with the cultural belief regarding girls marrying before 
menarche, but has a positive effect for men who are moderate about this cultural belief, and 
has a strong negative effect for men who strongly agreed with it. It is likely that men who 
strongly disagreed with the cultural belief may be very idealistic about romantic love, which 
leaves little room for economic motivation. They tend to search for a long time to find an 
ideal spouse. Therefore, whether they had employment experience or not, these men have 
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much lower marriage rates. For men who were moderate about the cultural belief, the non-
economic motivation does not play a prominent role here. Being economically attractive on 
the marriage market, those with employment are thus more likely to marry earlier. However, 
for men who strongly agreed with the cultural belief, non-economic motivation plays a 
prominent role. Those without employment experience may sense their disadvantage on the 
marriage market and search out wives quickly, unwilling to look too long for ideal spouses. 
In Figure 1.5, employment shows a positive effect on marriage formation for men. Further, 
the more important men’s perceptions of the importance of marriage to their mothers, the 
stronger the effect of employment. The economic motivation and non-economic motivation 
thus work in the same direction to increase marriage formation for men. 
  Figure 1.6 shows a stronger effect of employment on marriage formation for men 
who had reached their parents’ ideal marriage age than for those who had not. Again, for men 
who had reached the ideal marriage age and also had employment experience, the cultural 
pressure and being financially attractive to women looking for husbands accelerate these 
men’s pace to marriage. Figure 1.7 shows that parental attitudes towards girls marrying 
before menarche modifies the effect of employment on men’s marriage formation. For all 
men except those whose parents have the highest score on the attitude favoring girls 
marrying before menarche, employment is positively related to men’s marriage formation. 
However, the more parents were in favor of girls marrying before menarche, the weaker the 
employment effects are. Furthermore, for men whose parents were extremely supportive of 
this cultural belief, there was not much difference between those with employment 
experience and those without. The picture here is the battle between the economic and non-
economic motivations. On the one hand, employment is related to economic attractiveness on 
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the marriage market and makes men suitable for marriage sooner rather than later. On the 
other hand, sons may think that parents’ ideas regarding girls marrying before menarche are 
outdated and irrelevant. Employment thus provides them economic leverage and autonomy to 
postpone marriage to some degree. Further, for men whose parents were extremely 
supportive of the cultural belief, employment does not show much effect. It is likely that the 
non-economic motivation with respect to parents’ pressure is so prominent that economic 
motivation does not have much room to play a role. In Figure 1.8, we can see an interaction 
between years of education and the parental attitudes towards girls marrying before 
menarche. In general, education is positively associated with men’s marriage formation. 
However, the more parents supported this cultural belief, the higher the marriage rates for 
individuals at all levels of education. Here, the non-economic and economic motivations 
work the same direction to increase marriage rates for all.   
       
DISCUSSION 
 Employment has no direct effect on marriage formation for women but has positive 
effects for men. School enrollment is negatively associated with marriage formation for both 
men and women. Educational attainment is positively associated with marriage formation for 
women but negative for men. However, the interaction of educational attainment with 
parents’ attitudes regarding girls marrying before menarche shows a positive effect for men. 
In general, economic resources may increase individuals’ attractiveness on the marriage 
market, and thus facilitate marriage formation. However, it is also likely that they can buy 
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economic independence for women and provide leverage against cultural or familial pressure 
to marry early for both men and women.    
Various ideational measures, including respondents’ attitudes, their subjective norms, 
and their parents’ attitudes are shown to affect marriage formation for both men and women. 
The general picture is that if individuals are more or less pro-marriage or feel pro-marriage 
pressure – for example, they strongly agree that girls should marry before menstruation or 
that their getting married soon is very important to their mothers – that individual would be 
more likely to marry sooner than others. Parents’ promarriage attitudes regarding marriage 
also help individuals to enter marriage sooner. The implication is that ideational factors are 
contextual: individuals’ decision-making regarding marriage formation is affected by 
significant others and likely by social norms in the context where they live. Thereby, in the 
setting of Nepal and other similar social contexts, to examine family behaviors, it is 
important to consider not only family socioeconomic background, but also parents’ attitudes 
and relevant social norms. The challenge is to identify what specific ideational factors and 
relevant social contexts are.  
 However, it is important to be aware of the potential endogeneity issue regarding the 
ideal age of marriage. For example, remaining single for long time can change young 
person's ideal age of marriage. Yet, I do not have longitudinal measures to sort out the 
potential entangled relationship. It is thus important to keep in mind to interpret this 
relationship between ideal marriage age and timing of marriage as association rather than 
causation. 
Furthermore, interactions between certain economic and ideational factors suggest a 
complicated mechanism concerning the economic and non-economic motivations underlying 
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marriage formation processes. For women, economic factors can both increase marriage 
hazards and help buy economic independence to avoid early marriage, dependent on how 
strong non-economic motivations (cultural, social norm and familial pressure) are. When 
experiencing extreme pressure from culture and social norms, economic motivations tend to 
be secondary to non-economic motivations. For men, driven by non-economic motivations 
such as cultural pressure, economic factors tend to be positively associated with marriage 
formation and usually have stronger effects. However, with extreme cultural pressure, 
economic factors can lose effect. Furthermore, under extreme pressure from parents, men 
also try to use economic leverage to postpone marriage formation. It is worth noting that non-
economic motivations may not result in a real marriage without a good amount of economic 
resources, such as income from employment. This has great implications for relatively low 
marriage rates among socioeconomically disadvantaged groups in Western settings such as in 
the United States. 
 Education is a bit more complicated as an economic measure. It can mean that 
individuals have two attractive traits on the marriage market. First, education is closely 
related to potential jobs and income. Second, education is highly valued, and educated people 
are highly respected in the Hindu culture (Olivelle, 1999). Both traits can be positive factors 
in the rational part of the interactive approach. Other research indicates that educated people 
may think differently and tend to postpone marriage (Caldwell, 1982; Martin, 1995). This 
research does not seem to support the latter case. Thereby, to be precise, education should be 
partially interpreted as a socioeconomic measure. Furthermore, the first round of CVFS does 
not provide a complete to-date history of education. As I discussed earlier that it is likely 
women were close to completing education while a significant number of men had not 
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completed their education yet. Therefore, special caution is needed when interpreting effects 
of educational attainment, especially for men.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 This paper contributes to the literature by specifically theorizing and then testing how 
the influences of socioeconomic and ideational factors on the timing of marriage interact 
with one another. It extends the current understanding of the integration of economic and 
ideational approaches in studies of marriage timing and addresses critical gaps concerning 
the interactive dynamics of economics and culture in family studies and social demography. 
It has significant theoretical implications for the further exploration of the dynamics of 
economic and non-economic motivations underlying family formation behaviors and beyond.  
 For future research, it is important to incorporate richer and more informative 
economic measures, such as income, complete employment and education history, and other 
relevant financial measures. This research uses education as an indicator of socioeconomic 
attainment. Past research suggests that it can also function as an ideational force (Bongaarts 
& Watkins, 1996; Caldwell, 1982; Martin, 1995). In-depth interviews to solicit descriptions 
and emergent patterns of marital processes will help to disentangle the economic and 
ideational components of education in the complicated process of marriage formation. The 
use of a mixed methods approach will help further understand the dynamics of how 
education affects marriage formation.  
Furthermore, this interactive approach regarding the influences of socioeconomic 
factors and ideational factors on marriage formation is empirically supported in the Chitwan 
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Valley. The implication is, the economic-versus-non-economic motivation interaction 
approach can be a useful framework to investigate family formation behaviors in various 
cultural settings and social contexts in both non-Western and Western societies.  
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_______________ 
NOTES 
1. In the paper, the variable work (employment) includes in-home businesses. In models not 
reported here, I also estimated the effects of nonfamily work, for which I excluded in-home 
businesses. The results show that the effect of work (including in-home businesses) is 
stronger and more significant on family formation, compared to nonfamily work (excluding 
in-home businesses). It suggests that individuals with more income and other economic 
resources are more likely to marry sooner. Therefore, using this measure can better detect 
economic incentives underlying marriage formation behaviors.  
 
2. Limited by the data, I don't have a complete history of education. It is possible that many 
women had either completed or was close to completing their educations by 1996, while a 
significant number of men were far from completing their educations by 1996. One strategy 
that I adopted in the paper is to control for school enrollment in 1996. In models not reported 
here, I also estimated effects for school enrollment at age 10 and whether the respondent had 
any education at all on marriage formation for men. Both variables have negative effects on 
marriage formation. Signification interactions include those of school enrollment with 
attitude regarding girls marrying before menarche and importance of mother’s preference of 
marriage timing, and those of ever having education with attitude regarding girls marrying 
before menarche, importance of mother’s preference of marriage timing and parental 
attitudes regarding girls marrying before menarche. Results are available from the author 
upon request.  
 
3. By lagging the migration status for a month, I avoided the competing risks of marriage and 
migration, considering that some people move out or move in to a new household at the time 
of marriage, especially women. An alternative approach would be to compare each month's 
residence to a previous month. During my fieldwork in Nepal, I found that people migrated 
to Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries to work. After they had earned enough 
money, they returned and married. The dynamics of migration with regard to marriage are as 
follows: When they are away, they are not married; when they return, they marry. The 
purpose of controlling for migration is not to monitor whether respondents are physically 
away but to examine the influences of their migration experience. This dynamic way of 
measuring migration can capture both moving out, moving back, and moving to different 
places. It thus represents the history and direction of migration. There are a small number of 
people who migrated out and never came back. These people are then right censored. 
Unfortunately, the nature of the variable coding does not allow me to experiment with this 
strategy. 
 
 4. The observation time is 126 months. So not each of the 12 months in the year is repeated 
the same number of times. 
 
 5. I first used Proc Glimmix with SAS to estimate multilevel hazard models to address the 
inflated standard error problem (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Axinn & Yabiku, 2001; Barber 
et al., 2000; Yabiku, 2004, 2005 & 2006). The model allows for a random intercept to vary 
by neighborhood. However, the models did not converge. A possible reason is that the 
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correlation among neighborhoods was not substantial. I then used the SAS Proc Genmod to 
estimate the discrete-time hazard model and correct inflated standard errors at the same time. 
The results confirmed my original speculation that the correlation among neighborhoods was 
small, with the correlation coefficients constantly less than .002 for all models I estimate. 
 
 6. The term ‘marriage market’ which I used in the paper loosely follow Gary Becker and 
V.K. Oppenheimer's idea regarding marriage formation as the process of searching potential 
spouse, either following the foreign trade model (Gary S. Becker) or the job search model 
(Valerie Kincade Oppenheimer). Therefore, in this dissertation, ‘marriage market’ is 
understood as the pool of men and women who are potential candidates for those who are 
actively looking for a mate. It is termed t for the sake of convenience of usage and the 
marriage market theories are not the focused concern here. 
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics, CVFS (N = 389 women, N = 420 men) 
  Women   Men 
 
Mean/ 
Frequency SD Range 
 
Mean/ 
Frequency SD Range 
Married between 1996 and 2007 0.88 0.33 0-1   0.72 0.45 0-1 
Socioeconomic Attainment 
       Ever had work before 1996 0.5 0.5 0-1 
 
0.51 0.5 0-1 
Highest year of schooling in 
1996 6.61 2.88 0-14 
 
7.66 2.53 0-14 
Enrolled in school in 1996 0.72 0.45 0-1 
 
0.69 0.46 0-1 
Individual Attitudes and  Subjective Norm 
     Reached ideal marriage age a 
(lagged one month) 
0.52 0.5 
  
0.43 0.5 0-1 
       Marry before menstruation 
             Strongly disagree 10.54% 
   
5.95% 
        Disagree 71.72% 
   
72.14% 
        Agree 10.03% 
   
14.52% 
        Strongly agree (ref) 7.71% 
   
7.38% 
  Important to mother to get married 
            Not important at all 56.54% 
   
47.46% 
        Somewhat important 34.03% 
   
37.77% 
        Very important (ref) 9.42% 
   
14.77% 
  Parental Attitudes 
       Reached ideal marriage age a 
(lagged one month) 
0.6 0.49 0-1 
 
0.31 0.46 0-1 
       Marry before menstruation 2.53 0.67 1.5-4 
 
2.55 0.71 1-4 
Control Variables 
       Time 
       Age 16.79 1.54 15-20 
 
17.1 1.56 15-20 
Caste/Ethnicity 
             High-caste Hindu (ref) 56.81% 
   
53.33% 
        Low-caste Hindu 7.46% 
   
10.48% 
        Newar 9.77% 
   
5.95% 
        Hill Tibeto-Burmese 10.80% 
   
13.81% 
        Terai Tibeto-Burmese 14.91% 
   
15.71% 
        Others 0.26% 
   
0.71% 
  Ever migrated by 1996 0.27 0.44 0-1 
 
0.31 0.46 0-1 
Migrated after 1996a (lagged 
one month) 
0.88 0.32 0-1 
 
0.59 0.49 0-1 
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Marriage month 
             1 3.60% 
   
4.05% 
        2 10.28% 
   
9.76% 
        3 17.74% 
   
12.14% 
        4 4.37% 
   
4.52% 
        5 18.51% 
   
13.33% 
        6 10.03% 
   
5.24% 
        7 21.34% 
   
33.57% 
        8 1.03% 
   
3.10% 
        9 1.03% 
   
2.14% 
        10 1.80% 
   
2.38% 
        11 2.83% 
   
2.38% 
        12 (ref) 7.46% 
   
7.38% 
  Family Socioeconomic Status 
       Family economic resources 
             Component 1 0.38 1.02 -5.28 
 
0.36 1.1 -5.89 
      Component 2 0.14 0.98 -4.92 
 
0.18 1.07 -4.99 
      Component 3 0.26 1.16 -8.57 
 
0.26 1.21 -8.57 
Father ever worked 0.48 0.5 0-1 
 
0.61 0.49 0-1 
Father's highest year of 
schooling 
3.98 4.43 0-16 
 
4.12 4.48 0-16 
       Mother's number of children 5.31 1.94 1-12   4.82 2.13 0-15 
a timing-varying variable (the descriptive statistics are from the last month of observation) 
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Table 1.2. Effects of Socioeconomic and Individual and Parental Ideational Factors on Timing of 
Marriage for Women, CVFS (N = 389)a 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Socioeconomic 
Attainment                 
Ever had work 1.13 
      
1.05 
Highest year of 
schooling 
 
1.06* 
     
1.06+ 
Enrolled in 
school in 1996 
 
0.67* 
     
0.73+ 
Individual Attitudes and Subjective 
Norm 
      Reached ideal 
marriage age b 
  
1.17 
    
1.25 
Marry before menstruation  (ref = Strongly 
agree) 
           Strongly 
disagree 
   
0.66+ 
   
0.64+ 
      Disagree 
   
0.58** 
   
0.57** 
      Agree 
   
0.45** 
   
0.45* 
Important to mother to get married (ref =Very important) 
          Not 
important at all 
    
1.09 
  
1.2 
      Somewhat 
important 
    
1.19 
  
1.29 
Parental 
Attitudes 
        Reached ideal 
marriage age b 
     
0.86 
 
0.84 
Marry before 
menstruation 
      
0.84+ 0.85 
Control 
Variables 
        Time 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01** 1.01*** 1.01*** 
Age 1.06 1.01 1.07 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.08+ 1.03 
Caste (ref = High-caste 
Hindu) 
             Low-caste 
Hindu 0.97 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 1.07 1.08 1.16 
      Newar 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.93 0.82 0.82 0.83 
      Hill Tibeto-
Burmese 1.27 1.25 1.3 1.14 1.25 1.28 1.32 1.19 
      Terai 
Tibeto-Burmese 0.53* 0.60+ 0.56* 0.54* 0.55* 0.50* 0.5 0.57+ 
      Others 
        Ever migrated 1.70* 1.68* 1.67* 1.79** 1.64* 1.58* 1.60* 1.65* 
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by 1996 
Migrated after 
1996b 1.08 1.15 1.11 1.09 1.14 1.19 1.2 1.29 
Family socioeconomic 
status 
       Family 
economic 
resources 
              Component 
1 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 
      Component 
2 0.85+ 0.82* 0.85+ 0.85+ 0.85+ 0.84+ 0.84+ 0.82+ 
      Component 
3 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 
Father ever 
worked 0.97 1.01 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.89 0.9 0.89 
Father's highest 
year of 
schooling 
0.98 0.97+ 0.97 0.97+ 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 
Mother's 
number of 
children 
1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.07 
a for sake of saving space, the dummy variables month are not shown 
   b time-varying 
variable 
        +p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (one tailed tests, except two-tailed tests for controls) 
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Table 1.3. Effects of Socioeconomic and Individual and Parental Ideational Factors on Timing of Marriage for Men, CVFS (N = 420)a  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Socioeconomic Attainment               
Ever had work 1.55** 
      
1.51** 
Highest year of schooling 
 
0.94* 
     
0.93* 
Enrolled in school in 1996 
 
0.74* 
     
0.76+ 
Individual Attitudes and Subjective Norm      
   Reached ideal marriage age b 
 
1.03 
    
1.26+ 
Marry before menstruation  (ref = Strongly agree) 
           Strongly disagree 
   
0.36** 
   
0.53* 
      Disagree 
   
0.71+ 
   
0.85 
      Agree 
   
0.72 
   
0.84 
Important to mother to get married (ref = Very important)      
         Not important at all 
    
0.56** 
  
0.55** 
      Somewhat important 
    
0.75+ 
  
0.73+ 
Parental Attitudes 
        Reached ideal marriage age b 
     
0.73* 
 
0.72* 
Marry before menstruation 
      
1.04 1.01 
Control Variables 
        Time 1.02** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 
Age 1.31*** 1.35*** 1.34*** 1.34*** 1.33*** 1.31*** 1.35*** 1.31*** 
Caste (ref = High-caste Hindu) 
            Low-caste Hindu 1.17 1.02 1.13 1.13 1.09 1.1 1.14 1.02 
      Newar 0.78 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.68 
      Hill Tibeto-Burmese 1.41+ 1.33 1.37 1.38 1.48+ 1.4 1.43+ 1.41 
      Terai Tibeto-Burmese 1.3 1.21 1.3 1.36 1.42 1.23 1.31 1.26 
      Others 2.40* 1.90+ 2.05 1.93 1.72 1.93 2.06 1.42 
Ever migrated by 1996 0.93 0.89 0.88 0.9 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.97 
 49 
Migrated after 1996b 2.02*** 1.91*** 1.95** 1.90*** 1.99*** 2.01*** 1.95*** 1.99*** 
Family socioeconomic status 
      Family economic resources 
              Component 1 1.03 1.03 1 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.05 
      Component 2 0.92 0.97 0.91 0.93 0.98 0.94 0.93 1.09 
      Component 3 1.07 1.08 1.05 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.05 
Father ever worked 0.92 0.97 0.93 1 0.99 0.94 0.95 1 
Father's highest year of schooling 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.93** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.93*** 
Mother's number of children 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.94+ 0.93+ 0.93+ 0.92* 
a for sake of saving space, the dummy variables month are not shown 
   b time-varying variable 
        +p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (one tailed tests, except two-tailed tests for controls)      
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Table 1.4. Interaction Effects of Socioeconomic and Ideational Factors on Timing of Marriage, CVFS(N = 389 women, N = 420 men)a 
  
Women   Men 
1 2 3 
 
4 5 6 7 8 
Socioeconomic Attainment                   
Ever had work 0.83 0.62+ 
  
0.62 
2.61*
* 
1.29
+ 
3.27
* 
 
Highest year of schooling 
  
1.10*
* 
     
1.05 
Enrolled in school in 1996 
  
0.66* 
     
0.70
* 
Individual Attitudes and Subjective Norm 
        Reached ideal marriage age b 0.91 
 
2.07* 
      Marry before menstruation  (ref = Strongly agree) 
       
      Strongly disagree 
 
0.56+ 
  
0.25*
* 
    
      Disagree 
 
0.37**
* 
  
0.38*
* 
    
      Agree 
 
0.28**
* 
  
0.35* 
    Important to mother to get married (ref = Very important) 
            Not important at all 
     
0.78 
         Somewhat important 
     
1.02 
   Interaction between socioeconomic attainment and individual attitudes and 
subjective norm          
         
Ever had work*Reached ideal marriage age 
1.68
* 
        Ever had work*Marry before menstruation 
              Had work*Strongly disagree 
 
1.02 
  
1.6 
          Had work*Disagree 
 
1.93* 
  
2.51* 
          Had work*Agree 
 
2.03+ 
  
3.21* 
    Highest year of schooling *Reached ideal marriage age 
  
0.92* 
      Ever had work*Important to mother to get married 
             Had work*Not important at all 
     
0.51* 
         Had work*Somewhat important 
     
0.56+ 
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Parental Attitudes 
         Reached ideal marriage age b 
      
0.53 
  
Marry before menstruation 
       
1.22
+ 1.66 
Interaction between socioeconomic attainment and parental attitudes  
   
Ever had work*Reached ideal marriage age 
      
1.58
* 
  
Ever had work*Marry before menstruation 
       
0.74
+ 
 
Highest year of schooling*Marry before menstruation                 
0.94
+ 
a Control variables are not reported here 
         b time-varying variable  
         +p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (one tailed tests, except two-tailed tests for controls) 
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CHAPTER 2 
JUGGLE MARRIAGE AND SCHOOLING? WOMEN IN THE CONTEXT OF NEPAL 
INTRODUCTION 
 Education is a key factor associated with family formation, with women’s education 
attracting special attention among social scientists. Much research is involved in the debate 
about whether educated women are forgoing marriage due to economic independence 
(Becker, 1991), postponing marriage due to a longer search time (Oppenheimer, 1988), or 
even more attractive in the marriage market due to extra income to pool for the couple 
(Cherlin, 2001). After Goldstein and Kenney’s (2001) influential paper on this issue, research 
has increasingly reported that educated women tend to have higher marriage rates in many 
industrial countries (Bloom & Bennett, 1990; Goldscheider & Waite, 1986; Goldstein & 
Kenney, 2001; Lichter et al., 1992; Oppenheimer, 1994). Yet on the flip side of this field of 
research, scholars focus on how early marriage or early childbearing can interrupt women’s 
education, affect their educational attainment and then negatively influence the wellbeing of 
both women and their children in the long run (Hango & Bourdais, 2007; Hofferth, Reid & 
Mott, 2001).  
Little research directly addresses whether women combine marriage and student roles 
and how they do so, although research does examine how educated women postpone 
marriage or early marriage negatively affect women’s educational attainment in the long run 
as discussed above. The underlying assumption is that the family and student roles are in
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conflict because both are highly demanding in terms of time and financial resources 
(Blossfeld & Huinink 1991; Thornton, Axinn & Teachman, 1995; Raymo, 2003). This 
aforementioned conversation mostly occurs in and applies to Western industrialized societies, 
and it may be true that it is extremely difficult for women to compromise between family and 
student roles in these societies. But do women negotiate between student and family roles “in 
specific cultural and social contexts” of rapid socioeconomic development (Thornton & 
Fricke, 1987)?      
My investigating women’s combining their student and family roles in the cultural 
context of Nepal is motivated by the following theoretical and empirical points. First, 
modernization theory predicts the convergence of family behaviors around the world in the 
course of fast industrialization and urbanization (Goode, 1963). Thornton (2005) analyzes 
that the diffusion of ideational forces through globalization speeds up the so-predicted 
convergence towards westernization in the name of “modernization.” However, he notes that 
it is dangerous to interpret history “sideways” by transposing the history of Western societies 
to contemporary developing societies, which entirely neglects the autonomy and power of 
historic culture of the local societies. It is likely that in a transitional society like Nepal, 
women may have different patterns of family behaviors and ways of dealing with marriage 
and student role conflicts, compared to their Western counterparts. 
Second, research indicates that when the breadwinner-homemaker family mode was 
popular in the United States, the independence hypothesis that highly educated women with 
good income prospects are less likely to marry or give birth to more children was relevant 
(Becker, 1991). However, as dual-income families have become the norm, women’s 
education and economic sources contribute to marriage (Cherlin, 2000; Oppenheimer, 1988). 
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Accordingly, women in transitional societies, especially societies where gender ideology and 
gendered household labor division are still common, the independence hypothesis still holds 
(Martin-Garcia & Baizan, 2006). However, the danger is to ignore the “specific cultural and 
social contexts” of these societies (Thornton & Fricke, 1987). To avoid the pitfall of turning 
history “sideways”, I have decided to focus on how women juggle family and student roles in 
the context of Nepal, rather than looking at how they choose one at the cost of the other 
following the conventional model, the independence hypothesis, tested numerously in 
Western societies.      
 Third, education empowers women to improve social equality for both themselves 
and their daughters. Further, although education empowering women has been much 
discussed in the public dimension, it is less investigated inside the private family (Murphy-
Grahm, 2010). Malik and Courtney (2011) find that participation in higher education 
empowers Pakistani women through economic independence and raising status inside and 
outside the family. Mother’s education can influence daughter’s education (Afridi, 2010), 
timing of marriage and fertility (Bate et al., 2007; Maitra, 2004). Ahmed, Creanga, Gillespie 
and Tsui’s (2010) 31 countries study shows that education is positively associated with using 
maternal health service and this can help to improve maternal survival which affects both 
women and their children. Another study reports that education improves both women and 
their children's HIV/AIDs infection (Scanlan, 2010). Education is thus important for both 
women’s and their children’s life course trajectories and has important implications for 
public health and public policy. Thus, understanding whether women continue education 
after marriage and what factors contribute is theoretically, culturally and practically 
significant.   
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This research asks whether women continue or ever go back to school after their 
marriage in the context of Nepal and further examines what characteristics of these women 
shape their post-marriage education continuation, including their family background, 
education level and whether their marriage is love, arranged or combined marriage. First, I 
introduce the geographic and cultural setting of this study, Chitwan Valley, Nepal. Second, I 
draw on data from semi-structured interviews I conducted with recently married men and 
women in the Chitwan Valley of Nepal. Building on the interviews and existing literature, I 
hence develop contextually relevant hypotheses regarding post-marriage education 
continuation among Nepalese women. Third, I employ survey data from Ideational 
Influences on Marriage and Fertility Behaviors (IIMFB) collected in Chitwan Valley, Nepal 
to test the above hypotheses. Finally, I discuss limitations and contributions of my study in 
the conclusion section.  
My findings show that a significant number of women who had not completed their 
education continue it after marriage, and women whose parents were more educated have 
higher rates to continue it. Furthermore, the more education women have before marriage, 
the more likely they will continue it after marriage. Women who and their parents were both 
involved in the marriage formation decision are more likely to continue their education, 
compared to those had high autonomy in making their decision regarding marriage. For 
women whose marriages were mostly arranged by the parents, they are more likely to 
continue their education when they themselves had no or moderate education, compared to 
their counterparts who had high autonomy in forming their own marriage. However, the 
relationship reverses for those with university education.     
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SETTING 
The Chitwan Valley in Nepal 
 An in-land country in South Asia, Nepal is located between the Tibetan Plateau in 
China and the north plains of India, including the Mountain, Hill and Terai regions (Choe, 
Thapa & Mishra, 2004). The Chitwan Valley is located in the Terai region, about 100 miles 
southwest to Kathmandu and bordering India to the north. It follows a patrilineal system and 
has a heavy Hindu influence. Culturally, it is close to northern India, western Bangladesh and 
eastern Pakistan (Yabiku, 2005). Until the 1950s, the valley was still covered by forests and 
jungles with a small population of indigenous people. The Nepalese government at the time, 
with the help of the US government, eradicated malaria, cleaned the jungles, and turned this 
jungle area to farmland (Axinn & Yabiku, 2001; Shivakati et al., 1999). The Chitwan Valley 
has thus become an economic hub between Nepal and India (Axinn & Yabiku, 2001; 
Ghimire, Axinn, Yabiku & Thornton, 2006).  
 Rapid social transformations occurred that changed the organization of people’s lives; 
services previously provided within the family (e.g., transportation, employment, and health 
care) began to be outsourced to nonfamily institutions. Increased education and employment 
opportunities and exposure to mass media convey Western values regarding family behaviors 
and provide alternatives to marraige (Axinn & Yabiku, 2001; Yabiku, 2004, 2005 & 2006). 
In spite of striking social changes, the historical Nepalese family values and systems 
prevailed; marriage is universal and early marriage is normative and women marry even 
earlier. More than 98 percent men and women between the age of 30 and 34 years old were 
married, and the average age at first marriage in the Chitwan Valley was 17.6 years for 
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females and 21.9 for males between 1990 and 1996 (Yabiku, 2005). However, changes 
relevant to family behaviors were evident.  
 Parental authority lessened, and individuals gained increased autonomy and economic 
independence (Thornton & Fricke, 1987; Thornton & Lin, 1994). Barber (2001) finds that 
decision-making regarding marriage, previously controlled mostly by parents, is now shifting 
to a process that allows more individual control. However, because of a long history of 
religious and social norms encouraging arranged marriages, individuals are still willing to 
allow parents some control over the marriage process (Barber, 2004; Ghimire et al., 2006). 
The mixing of strong cultural influences and increased nonfamily opportunities thus makes 
Chitwan Valley an ideal setting to study how women juggle marriage and education in their 
daily life. 
 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW METHODS AND DATA 
Sample 
 I conducted semi-structured interviews in Chitwan Valley, Nepal with the help of a 
Nepalese assistant during 2008 and 2009 (Please see Appendix 2.1 in the end). The diversity 
of the study sample was obtained by recruiting participants with variance in age, gender, 
caste/ethnicity, and education. The research assistant and I recruited ten women and ten men 
who became married in around the past twelve months at the time of recruitment and were 
between the ages of 15 to 34 at the time of marriage. Half of the sample had education levels 
higher than high school completion. The sample is split equally across each of the following 
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caste/ethnicity groups: High Caste Hindu, Low Caste Hindu, Terai Tibeto-Burmese, Hill 
Tibeto-Burmese and Newar.  
Semi-Structured Interview 
 The semi-structured interviews started with a short questionnaire on general demographic 
information. The interviews were usually conducted at respondents’ private homes. Before 
the interview started, the research assistant obtained formal oral consent from each 
respondent. The interviews were completely voluntary and lasted about one hour. All 
interviews were done in Nepali and were conducted by a native Nepali-speaking interviewer. 
I observed and recorded the interviews, answered questions, and addressed occasional 
problems during the interviews. The semi-structured interviews asked questions about 
marriage processes, such as how the participant met his/her spouse, how the decision 
regarding marriage was made, particularly when faced with different opinions from family, 
friends and neighbors, what kind of spouse the participant looked for, what personal 
traits/attainments made him/her a potentially attractive partner, how many children the 
participant and his/her spouse wanted, and whether the couple used contraceptives.  
 After all interviews were completed, the audio files were transcribed into Nepali 
transcripts. Identifiers such as names and places were removed from the transcripts. The 
transcripts were then translated to English, typed and saved.  
Analysis  
 I employed ATLAS.ti to organize my analysis of the interview transcripts. First, I 
went over the transcripts multiple times looking for repeated themes and concepts. Second, I 
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classified the topics and patterns most frequently mentioned as specific codes and return to 
each transcript systematically, exploring for every code.  
 
INTERVIEWS, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
To Be Married or to Be Educated? Or Is There a Third Route? 
 Education is highly valued in the context of Nepal. Almost all my participants 
suggested that ideally, unmarried young people should complete their education first and 
then marry. However, in reality, about half of my participants were either still in school after 
marriage, supported their spouse to go to school, or showed strong interest in going back to 
school. Kamala, a college student, desired to continue her education after marriage. She was 
supported by her husband’s family. She described,   
I had such a feeling from the beginning. It isn't necessary to discontinue the 
studies after marriage, is it?  
I had some (education) before marriage. I wanted to continue education and be 
independent.  
Well, I want to continue my studies even after my marriage. And the other family 
members also support my decision about continuing school. My husband and in-
laws have allowed me to continue my studies. Anyway, there is no restriction. I'm 
free to study.  
Kamala emphasized that there was “no restriction” from her parents-in-law and that 
she was “free to study.” This tells us that due to the patrilocal tradition of living with the 
husband’s family, the authority and resources that parents-in-law have, is essential for 
Kamala’s educational aspiration to be realized. Another respondent, Sita, lived with her 
husband and two of his older sisters who had never married. Her work place was far from 
home. Therefore, during working time, she stayed with her parents. In the weekends, she 
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came back home to her husband and his sisters. She realized the conflict between student and 
family roles and suggested that family support was indispensable, 
I have thought if the situation becomes favorable (I will go back to school). But 
the situation before marriage and after marriage is different. Before marriage I 
was free in my parents’ home but now I have to fulfill my duties properly. I 
should do something for my family. 
If I have time and support for it I am very much interested (in completing my 
education). 
The best thing is to get married only after finishing school. If there is no choice, 
they should be allowed to continue their studies after marriage and the family 
should support them. 
 She mentioned that being single meant being free to do one’s will in her parents’ 
home and being married meant that she had duties and responsibilities to the husband’s 
family. Although she had a very demanding commute for her job, she still aspired to continue 
her education one day. However, Sita’s situation was unlike Kamala’s, in that, both of Sita’s 
in-laws were deceased and she did not have much familial support, financially and otherwise. 
This likely explains why Sita cannot continue her education after marriage. 
 Even as the Nepali society transits rapidly from an agricultural to an industrial 
economy, marriage is still universal and relatively early, with women marrying much earlier 
than men, and premarital sex is still not socially accepted, especially for women (Choe, 
Thapa & Mishra, 2004; Yabiku, 2005). For example, Caltabiano and Castiglioni (2008) 
report that almost 70 percent of wives reported that they were at least three years younger 
than their husbands.  
 It is common in Nepal, as in many transitional societies, that historic culture and local 
customs continue to have great influence on family behaviors. For example, the historic 
consanguineous marriage is still popular in many Middle Eastern and South Asian countries 
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when urbanization and industrialization is under way in fast pace (Abbasi-Shavazi, Mcdonald 
& Hosseini-Chavoshi, 2008). In spite of the rapid socio-economic development in Indonesia, 
marriage age and post-marriage residence are still regulated by the “adat”, the local, ethnic 
customs and norms, against the strong forces of modernization (Buttenheim & Nobles, 2009). 
Hirschman and Teerawichitchainan (2003) analyzed that decline in divorce rates in three 
Southeast Asian countries, in the opposite direction of what modernization and convergence 
theory predicts, is the result of the interaction between historic culture and modernization. 
 Moreover, many studies in other transitional societies going through rapid 
socioeconomic development report similar patterns. The influences of conventional values on 
marriage patterns have strengthened for Egyptian women (Amin & Al-Bassusi, 2004); in 
spite of Spanish and Portuguese women’s great improvement in education and employment 
in the public sphere, conventional gender ideology dominates gender relationship inside 
family (Dominguez-Folgueras & Castro-Martin, 2008); in Iran, consanguineous marriage is 
still popular though facing challenges from modernization (Abbasi-Shavazi, Mcdonald & 
Hosseini-Chavoshi, 2008); and under the influence of local custom and parental authority, 
arranged and cousin marriage prevail in Turkey (Ertem & Kocturk, 2008).  
In the face of Nepal’s rapid expansion of mass education and universal and early 
marriage, could there be a third route other than postponing marriage or having an early 
marriage while forgoing further education? As Thornton and colleagues (Thornton, Axinn & 
Teachman, 1995) asserted, family and student roles are in conflict because both are highly 
demanding in terms of time and financial resources. Women may not have enough financial 
support to continue school after marriage and also may not have enough time to attend school 
when household duties are more demanding compared to when being single.  
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However, the custom of living with the husband’s family after marriage in Nepal as 
well as other South Asian and Southeast Asian countries (Caldwell, 1982; Caldwell, Reddy 
& Caldwell, 1988), means likely financial support and housework help, such as cooking, 
cleaning, and childcare from the husband’s parents and other family members. Schuler and 
Rottach’s 2010 study in another South Asian country, Bangladesh, confirms that mothers-in-
law can exert their authority and share housework to help their daughters-in-law to continue 
education or take nonfamily employment. This patrilocal arrangement thus makes post-
marriage education feasible for young women, like these Nepalese women, solving the 
dilemma many Western women face regarding student and family role conflict. It deserves 
note there that this study is not interested in testing variance of the patrilocal living 
arrangement, which is thus treated as the cultural context. Rather, I am more interested in the 
possibility of whether women continue their education after marriage. Hence, I arrive at my 
first hypothesis,  
Hypothesis I: If women have not completed their education before getting married, they are 
more likely to continue their education after marriage, rather than abruptly ending their 
education. 
It is all about the Family 
 As Nirmala, a female, confessed in her interview, people generally look at education 
and family background when seeking a spouse. Family background, including family 
socioeconomic status and social reputation, especially parental education, is carefully 
evaluated when it comes to the matter of marriage. Family background means the social 
status of a family and prestige among the neighbors. My participants believed in qualities of 
children that come from families with good reputation.  
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 Ramesh and Narayan, both males, thought that family background can be an 
important criterion when looking for a spouse. Narayan further explained that good family 
background is conducive for the children to be educated and thus to preserve culture,  
If parents and guardians are educated their children also become educated. They 
walk on the path of their guardians. They follow tradition and culture of their 
parents. 
 Gopal, male, who had an arranged marriage recalled that when the girl’s family 
visited to talk about marriage, “They were only curious about our family members and 
family background.” Hari, another male, associated family background to social prestige and 
was of the view that a daughter would be judged according to her family reputation. As he 
said,  
Yes, family background also should be good, reputed. If the family members are 
educated then they can be popular because of their works and good manner; if the 
family members are educated then everyone knows them and it is taken on their 
family background. The main thing is if the guardians are educated then they 
always want to provide education to their children and so all the members can be 
educated that way, and as a result the family will be known as a good, reputed 
family in the neighborhood. And so the children walk in the path of their 
guardians. 
In my opinion, the most important thing is the family background. It is essential to 
know how the family members are and what prestige they have in the society. It is 
very important to know whether or not the bride was raised in a good respectable 
family. Therefore familial upbringing is the most important factor in determining 
a capable and desirable marriage partner.  
 My female participants seem to agree with their male counterparts in the important 
role of spouse’s family background, especially parental education. Nirmala relates parental 
education to a meaningful life, 
The most important is the education of the parents. If the parents are educated, all 
of the family would become educated. Education plays a vital role in making life 
meaningful. 
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 Both Kamala and Sunita considered parents’ education to be the most important thing. 
Whereas, Kamala deemed that educated parents can give fertility suggestions. Sunita 
underlined educated parents to be understanding and able to keep up with changing times. 
She went on,  
Life is easier if your family is educated. Educated parents are understanding. They 
know what is right or wrong. Uneducated parents talk about traditions. It’s not 
good. The time has changed.  
 Family background is a very important factor considered in my participants’ marriage 
formation process. Correspondently, a myriad of studies discuss the importance of parental 
socioeconomic resources on offspring’s marriage timing and educational attainment (Axinn 
& Thornton, 1992; South, 2001). In their 1992 classic paper, Axinn and Thornton identified 
complicated mechanisms that relate parental socioeconomic resources and their preference to 
their children’s education and timing of marriage. They posited that parental economic 
resources and educational achievement can help to socialize their offspring’s aspiration of 
educational goal and thus affect their marriage timing. Further, parents are able to utilize 
their financial resources to influence children’s marriage age according to their preference of 
ideal marriage age for their children. 
 In the context of the United States, Axinn and Thornton (1992) found a delaying 
effect of parental socioeconomic status, including financial resources and educational 
attainment, on their offspring’s marriage. However, in the context of Nepal, the outcome 
could be different when it comes to continuing education after marriage or compromising 
between marriage and education. With universal and early marriage in Nepal, especially for 
women, Nepalese families with high socioeconomic status may prefer their daughters both 
marrying early and achieving a good level of education. Another important cultural factor to 
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consider here is that premarital sex is a taboo for women. To attain their preference, and also 
to protect their daughter’s honor before marriage, parents may utilize their socio-cultural 
authority and financial resources to arrange a marriage for their daughter and also help her to 
continue education after marriage.  
 Because people have trust in those with a good family background, especially those 
whose parents are educated, married women from good family backgrounds also tend to be 
well educated, usually are well treated by others, and may also have high self-esteem. They 
are likely respected and have relatively high status in the husband’s family. In addition, their 
parents are also respected by the parents-in-law. The parents’ endorsing their daughter’s 
education is also likely to be supported by the daughter’s parents-in-law. Thus, I arrive at my 
second hypothesis with a focus on parental education, 
Hypothesis II: Women whose parents are well educated are more likely to continue their 
schooling after marriage, compared to their counterparts with less educated parents.  
Education is Everything 
 In my participants’ view, being educated means one is competent, able to find a well 
paid job, is understanding, competent in handling family relations, respected by neighbors, 
and able to educate others. For example, Hari linked education to good jobs and 
empowerment in life and pointed out that neighbors and the husband’s family judge the 
woman by her education. As he articulated, 
To summarize it in a sentence, an educated person is successful. Their married 
life can be easier as they have a good qualification for jobs and on the other hand 
they have a good knowledge of what is right and what is wrong. 
Education is not just important for marriage but for everything. We get all kinds 
of knowledge from education. Like, how to live, when to marry, whom to marry, 
how many children to have, how long the gap should be between two children.  
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After marriage, when a girl goes to her husband's home, she should be careful 
about various things. People in the community talk about the new arrival in the 
community, about how she is, how much she has studied. 
 Ram and Ramesh, both males, believed education as essential for the couple to have 
good, mutual understanding. Gopal, another male, stressed the role of education in helping 
the wife to gain status and establish a good relationship in the husband’s family. As he stated,  
If the daughter-in-law is educated then she can give suggestions to her mother-in-
law. You know, the parents especially mothers-in-law are not educated as there 
were no education facilities for them during their time. So if the daughter-in-law 
is educated she can convince her mother-in-law and make her aware of various 
kinds of issues. She can win their heart by being a good knowledgeable daughter-
in-law.   
 Now that we understand the importance of a wife’s education from the husband’s 
perspective, let’s turn to investigate what the wife has to say. Maya associated women’s 
education to attractive straits in the marriage market. She advanced to associate it to good 
jobs and even economic independence, 
Nowadays it (education) is the thing. Men look for educated women for marriage 
partners. Education is everything now. Uneducated person is nothing. I too 
believe that it’s true because everyone should have education, every female. If 
they are educated, they also can have job in offices. If in case, their husbands left 
them they could work outside the house to support themselves. 
 Although Maya’s confession sounds much “westernized” and concurs with the 
independence hypothesis in the academic field of family studies, the very same woman also 
claimed that, “We should depend only on our husband.” It is striking to see how 
“westernization” and keeping to historic culture walk hand-in-hand in the transitional society 
of Nepal. Further, Kamala alleged that education helps the wife to instruct family members 
and thus become a good wife, 
I think a good wife must be educated, so that she could educate other members of 
the family. She must be supportive and have good understanding. Education 
enables to get such qualities. 
 70 
 
 Geeta (female) further described how one’s education is judged by others in a 
comprehensive way, 
Because one’s education level is sought when looking for a potential spouse, you 
know. One’s character is judged on the basis to his education. For that education 
is very important. 
 Education is an important factor linking to women's empowerment and correlated 
with women's autonomy (Afridi, 2010; Bradley & Khor 1993; Desai & Alva, 1998; Stacki & 
Monkman, 2003). Murphy-Graham (2010) argues that education has empowered Indian 
women in their households through changing values, improving the couple's relationship and 
by providing better economic prospect. Bates et al. (2004) reported that women's education is 
related to reducing violence in rural Bangladesh, which indicates that education increases 
women’s autonomy and status.  
 Education can be connected to women’s possibility of continuing school in the 
following ways. In the context of Nepal, women are married much earlier than men and 
education is highly valued for wives, which is related to both potential jobs with good 
income and status inside and outside family. Therefore, as education level increases, the 
opportunity cost of discontinuing education after marriage is relatively high. Further, married 
women with more education may have higher autonomy and also usually have higher status 
in the in-laws’ family. As a result, they may be more likely to articulate their interest in 
continuing education, and their demand is also more likely to be supported by the husband’s 
family. And so I reach my third hypothesis,      
Hypothesis III: Highly educated women are more likely to continue their unfinished 
schooling after marriage, compared to their less educated counterparts.  
Love, Arranged and Combined Marriage 
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 As recently married men and women I interviewed narrated, young people either 
meet their future spouse by themselves or with help from their friends, fall in love, maybe 
elope, then inform the parents, come back to the husband’s home, and the parents may or 
may not put Tika (a mixing of rice and red powder) on their daughter-in-law’s forehead as an 
official recognition and acceptance of their marriage. This is how love marriage occurs, with 
no involvement from the parents at all. To some degree, this is a type of elopement and is 
more or less stigmatized.  
 In contrast, arranged marriage occurs through a different process. Family members or 
relatives help search for comparable young people, usually with an emphasis on education 
and family background, and then the families of the two young people come to an agreement 
through information exchange and possible negotiation. After that, they inform the young 
people and leave them for the final decision. In extreme cases, the young people are forced to 
accept their parents’ decision in a purely arranged marriage. Usually, young people have one 
to two weeks to make their decision. Combined marriage is a category between love and 
arranged marriage. Both parents or other family members and the young people themselves 
participate in the marriage formation process and make a joint decision in the end. This is 
also a popular type of marriage and involves a mix of parents’ and offspring’s agency.                        
 Geeta was a college student at the time of the interview. She had an arranged 
marriage. She referred the process of finding a spouse in an arranged marriage as a “shopping 
program.” She described the process of an arranged marriage, and how she had to get 
married at short notice. She described the cultural and social pressure she faced regarding the 
timing of marriage and how she was able to continue her education after marriage through 
negotiation, 
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This kind of marriage is done in agreement of both sides. First, someone from our 
side went to go talk to the groom’s family and then after that someone from their 
side came to talk with my family. 
It (the marriage) happened all of a sudden. I was not ready for the wedding. I was 
married with two weeks after the marriage was fixed.  
I believed that being a girl in a traditional society like Nepal I had to get married 
relatively early and my friends, relatives and neighbors all told me that I had to 
get married one day. But I would have preferred to get my B.A. first.  
And so I was concerned if I would be allowed to continue my studies after the 
wedding. Our parents on both sides agreed and I said yes to the marriage proposal. 
My husband’s family is educated and they have supported me and my education. 
 Madan, a male respondent, had a combined marriage. He told his story about how his 
marriage turned from love into arranged marriage. He and his wife had been in love for 
several years while he worked overseas and she was in school in Nepal. After he finished his 
job in Malaysia, he went to the girl’s parents to ask for the girl’s hand. Then the parents 
suggested them to get married after their daughter completed schooling. He then promised to 
help the daughter to continue her education. At the time of the interview, his wife was not 
with him, but was staying at a boarding house to prepare for high school completion exams. 
They only met each other once a week.  
 Bharat, another male respondent, was in love with his wife for several years too. He 
was afraid that “people would backbite, criticize our relationship and there would be bad 
rumor in the village.” So he and his bride eloped and got married. Similarly, Kavita, a female 
respondent, also had a love marriage. When she was only in the fifth grade, her family was 
unhappy that a daughter who would eventually move out was still staying at home doing 
nothing. Due to the family pressure, she soon eloped with her lover and was no longer in 
school after marriage.  
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There wasn't any work for me at home. My family did not support me and would 
shout or talk that daughters shouldn't live long with their parents. And they 
suggested that it would be better for them if I eloped and so I eloped.  
 Srijana, another female respondent, fell in love with her future husband during 
elementary school and went out secretly for several years. They got tired of being in a 
clandestine relationship, and finally decided to get married and were not in school after their 
marriage. According to her, love marriage is usually early and arranged marriage is usually 
late, which is consistent with Geeta’s idea that arranged marriage involves a busy “shopping” 
process and thus usually takes a longer time.  
We were ready to marry rather than meeting secretly. 
I thought it (marriage) was earlier. 
I don't know. May be love marriage is like this. It is earlier. 
Mostly the love marriages are early. 
It depends on the family. Love marriage has personal decision. Nobody can 
interfere. Otherwise, family plays important role. 
Arranged marriage is generally late. It depends on parents. 
  Love marriage is based on love and self choice, with no parental involvement 
whereas arranged marriage is decided by parents, usually based on the couple’s family status 
match (Applbaum 1995; 2007; Grover, 2009; Uberoi 1998). However, it is important to note 
that although much research assumes marriage type as a dichotomous variable, including 
love and arranged marriage, it should actually be understood as a continuum. In Nepal, even 
for young people who have an arranged marriage,  the couple are increasingly involved in 
their marriage decision-making process (Ghimire, Axinn, Scott & Thornton, 2006). Further, 
Uberoi (1998) and Grover (2009) report that in India, some young people had “arranged love 
marriage.” These young people fall in love, and then ask their parents to conduct a wedding 
for them, in seeking for social approval and support by parents. The concept is similar to the 
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term of combined marriage used in this study, which shows young people make compromise 
between personal autonomy and conventional authority to gain social acceptance.  
 Kishwar (1994) argued that women with an arranged marriage can continue to get 
financial and other support from parents while love marriage may greatly weaken this tie due 
to no parental support. Grover's (2009) ethnic research in Delhi, North India confirms this. In 
an arranged marriage, a woman usually keeps frequent contact with her mother after 
marriage. Her natal home can provide protection during hard times in her marriage and 
various support for her. However, love marriage violates this parental authority and 
matchmaking practice. There is usually certain resent and disapproval from the natal family. 
The married daughter thus lacks this mother-daughter bonding and financial and emotional 
buffer. 
However, love marriage may be related to post-marriage schooling in two ways. 
Young people now have more opportunities to meet with each other with the expansion of 
mass education. They can meet in the neighborhood, at religious/cultural festivals and more 
commonly through school. They fall in love in school and then go out secretly. After young 
people are in love for several years, and eventually fed up with rumors, they may decide to 
elope and then come back to the young husband’s home for nuptial life. It usually ‘happens 
naturally’ during their school years. Although they have the autonomy to decide to get 
married, financially they have to depend on the husband’s family for a living. It is up to the 
husband’s family if they are to continue their education. In contrast, for arranged and 
combined marriage, since the right time for a couple to get married is usually decided by the 
family members, the husband’s parents may decide to allow the daughter-in-law to go back 
to school. There is usually a busy ‘shopping’ time to find a qualified mate. Then there is a 
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negotiation process between the two families, with a consideration of the young people’s 
own opinion. Therefore, with the support and compromise from the family, young people can 
continue their school years if they have the desire to do so. Consequently, I have arrived at 
my fourth hypothesis,  
Hypothesis IV: Those who have an arranged or combined marriage are more likely to 
continue their schooling after marriage, compared to their love marriage counterparts.   
 Further, as I hypothesized before, as educational attainment increases, women are 
more likely to continue their education after marriage. However, due to different dynamics 
among arranged, combined and love marriages, women may follow different trajectories 
regarding post-marriage education continuation as their pre-marriage education level 
increases. As education levels increase, young people may gain more autonomy, which can 
overshadow parental support and sources, or combined marriages with both personal 
autonomy and parental support may be the most likely. Hence, I come upon my fifth 
hypothesis, 
Hypothesis V: As education level increases, those with a combined marriage are the most 
likely to pursue education continuation after marriage and those with a love marriage are the 
least likely to pursue it.          
 
SURVEY DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
 The survey data is from the 2008 Ideational Influences on Marriage and Fertility 
Behaviors (IIMFB), Nepal. The IIMFB is a longitudinal panel study that investigates 
ideational changes regarding family behaviors in Nepal. The first wave of the study was 
conducted in 2008. The sample is from 151 neighborhoods in Chitwan Valley, Nepal, 
 76 
 
including 7,456 men and women. The IIMFB collects data from all households in these 
neighborhoods. For my study, I first included 1,730 women who were married and between 
15 and 34 years of age by 2007. I further deleted 25 women due to missing values and the 
analysis sample size is thus 1,705. I drew on logistic regression technique to predict whether 
these women continued their education or went back to school based on data from 2008.   
Measures 
 The dependent variable, post-marriage education continuation is a dichotomous 
variable, measured by whether the respondent was in school for the complete year in the first 
year after her marriage. The reasons to use this measure is due to the following reasons, 1) 
for all the women who had ever gone to school after marriage, most of them had done it in 
the first year; 2) I did not include those who ended their schooling during the year 
considering these women may have to terminate their schooling due to student and family 
role conflict.  
 Independent variables include pre-marriage education completion, parental education, 
pre-marriage years of schooling and type of marriage. Pre-marriage education completion is 
measured by whether the woman was in school for the entire year in the year prior to her 
marriage or just beginning schooling at that time. It is likely that people decide to end 
schooling and get married in a short lapse of time or simultaneously. To avoid this 
endogeneity issue, I thus use whether women were in school for an entire year the year 
before marriage rather than the year at marriage. It is likely that women may have completed 
their schooling before marriage even if they were in school the entire year the year before 
marriage. Therefore, this measure likely overestimates school incompletion, and the effect of 
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marriage on post-marital schooling would be underestimated correspondingly. The real effect 
should be stronger and more significant.  
 Parental education is measured by the level of education of the woman’s father and 
mother. For pre-marriage years of schooling, I employ the life history calendar data from 
IIMFB to construct accumulative years of schooling before marriage. I only use those years 
when women were in school for the entire year to construct this measure. For years when 
women began schooling, ended schooling or began and ended schooling in the same year, 
IIMFB did not provide information regarding how many months these women were in school. 
Therefore, it is a conservative measure of accumulative years of schooling. Another point 
deserving note here is that repeating grades is not uncommon in this context. Therefore, this 
variable reflects women’s years of schooling, roughly measuring their educational attainment 
before marriage.  
Type of marriage involves three categories of love, arranged and combined. Love 
marriage is the marriage formed due to young people falling in love with each other; and 
parents have no involvement or interfering in the context of Nepal. Arranged marriage is 
mainly decided by parents. Usually other older family members are also involved, but not the 
young couple themselves. After everything is planned, they inform the young couple 
concerning the marriage decision, asking for their final approval. Combined marriage is a 
type of marriage formation that is a combination between arranged and love marriages, for 
which parents arrange the marriage, and at the same time young people also actively 
participate in the decision making process. They make a joint decision regarding the young 
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people’s marriage in the end.  In addition to the above independent variables, I also control 
for the following variables: age, age at marriage, and mother’s number of children.     
Model 
 I use logistic regression to estimate odds ratios of post-marriage education 
continuation. I first examine whether pre-marriage education completion predicts women’s 
post-marriage education. I further investigate whether their parents’ education, their pre-
marriage years of schooling and type of marriage explains the effect of pre-marriage 
education completion on post-marriage education continuation. Finally, I scrutinize whether 
there is an interaction between women’s pre-marriage years of schooling and marriage type 
on their post-marriage education.  
 One feature of the IIMFB design is that individuals are clustered within 
neighborhoods. Inflated standard errors are a prominent issue (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). I 
use Proc GENMOD with SAS 9.1 to estimate the above models, which estimates the 
correlations among all the neighborhoods and corrects the possibly inflated standard errors. 
 
REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 In total, about eight percent of married women have continued their education for the 
entire year in the first year after marriage (Table 2.1). If including women who were enrolled 
in school part of the year, then the percentage would increase to slightly more than one fourth. 
About 40 percent of women are in school for the entire year the year before their marriage. 
On average, parental years of education is low, only about four years. The average pre-
marriage years of schooling is about eight. About half of the respondents had an arranged 
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marriage, about one fifth had a combined marriage and less than one third had a love 
marriage.       
Model 1 shows there is a highly significant effect on post-marital schooling: if a 
woman was enrolled in school one year before marriage, she is more than 100 times more 
likely to continue education compared to those who were not in school then (See Table 2.2). 
This suggests in the context of Nepal, combining marriage and schooling is common. This is 
different from literature in Western, industrialized societies, where family and student roles 
are competing responsibilities and taking one usually means postponing or even forgoing the 
other. Further, Model 2 shows that for each additional year of parental education, married 
women’s rates of post-marriage education increase by roughly five percent. In the context of 
Nepal, parents still control more resources and have more authority over their offspring’s 
family formation. Parents who have more financial and socio-cultural resources may be more 
interested in investing in their daughter’s education and thus would like their daughter to 
continue their education after marriage. They may be able to influence their daughter’s post-
marriage education by cultivating the preference for valuing education, providing certain 
resources, or even exerting influence on the husband’s family directly.  
Moreover, Model 3 presents that each year of a woman’s pre-marriage schooling 
increases her rates of going to school after marriage by about 20 percent. Further, the number 
of years of pre-marriage schooling explains more than half of the variation of the effect of 
premarital educational incompletion on post-marital schooling. Quitting school after 
marriage without finishing means losing the potential for highly paid jobs in the future for 
well educated women. Educated women have high status in the husband’s family. The 
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husband’s family may be more likely to help them to realize their preference for continuing 
education by providing financial support and helping with household duties.   
In Model 4, combined marriage is associated with a higher rate of post-marriage 
education continuation than love marriage, by 39 percent. It may be easy to assume that those 
who had a love marriage may have more ‘modern’ values and desires and for that reason may 
value education more. Yet, it is not surprising that those with a combined marriage may have 
similar autonomy to those with a love marriage. They may equally desire to continue 
schooling after marriage if they have not completed it. However, those with a combined 
marriage may have endorsement of their marriage from their parents. They are thus more 
likely to have both financial and other support from parents concerning education 
continuation after marriage. In contrast, in the society where parents still have more 
resources and authority that are significant to young people’s lives, people who had a love 
marriage may have the autonomy to form their own marriage, but not necessarily are able to 
continue their education after marriage due to lack of resources and possibly support from 
their parents. Surprisingly, those with an arranged marriage are not significantly different 
from those with a love marriage. It is likely that due to educational heterogeneity, the effect 
may cancel each other. That is to say, the effect of arranged versus love marriage on post-
marriage education continuation may depend on education. Model 5 confirms that there is a 
significant interaction between arranged marriage and pre-marriage years of schooling on 
post-marriage education continuation. Results not shown here shows that as the education 
level increases, the effect of arranged versus combined marriage on post-marriage education 
continuation is also significant. The trajectory is similar to that in Figure 2.1. I use Figure 1 
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to visually present the odds ratio changes of type of marriage on post-marriage education 
continuation as years of pre-marriage schooling increases.   
In Figure 2.1, years of education increases the rates of post-marital schooling for all 
three types of marriages. Note here, only arranged marriage is significantly different from 
love marriage. There is a crossover at year thirteen of schooling, which is about college 
education where advantages of arranged marriage disappear. For those with an arranged 
marriage, women are generally more like to continue their education, compared to those in a 
love marriage. It is not until university education that the difference is reversed. In general, 
parents tend to control more resources and provide help for those with an arranged marriage 
to continue their uncompleted education. For those with a love marriage, it is not until they 
are at the university level that their economic prospect and their autonomy overshadow their 
parents’ influence over them.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 A prominent strength of this research lies in its using both qualitative and quantitative 
data collected at the same time in the same region. Qualitative data together with existing 
literature help to extract contextually relevant hypotheses regarding how married women 
combine family and student roles in Nepal, which is in contrary to much of the literature and 
women’s marriage behaviors in Western, industrialized societies. Further, representative 
quantitative data provide rich data to test these hypotheses and help contribute to 
understanding patterns of women’s marriage behaviors in this region.   
 82 
 
 Further, this study tests women’s marriage and education behaviors in a cultural 
setting where rapid social changes are under way. Individuals face social forces of 
industrialization and westernization and the desire to move up the socioeconomic ladder. At 
the same time, they are also under strong influence of local customs and family and kinship 
network. It is thus an ideal place to investigate how women are "inventive" in combining 
student and family roles in a context different from Western, industrialized societies. This 
study contributes to the literature of family studies and women's education in that it is 
important to understand women’s family and education behaviors in a specific cultural 
context and to realize the relevance and applicability of theories and empirical research in 
Western, industrialized societies. This inventive family pattern scrutinized in this research 
indicates that family behaviors are not necessarily converging toward the Western pattern. 
And the model of transposing the current family pattern in Western societies to the future of 
current developing societies is a dangerous way of “reading history sideways.” 
 In the cultural context of Nepal, to juggle education and marriage is not uncommon 
among Nepalese women who have not completed their education before marriage. The 
Nepalese cultural practice and family structure, such as parental authority and controlling of 
resources and post-marriage patrilocal living arrangement, seem to provide solid support for 
this distinct family pattern. However, it is important to note that the cultural practice and 
family structure here is treated as the social context. Future research can be conducted to 
measure characteristics of the cultural context of the transition in progress, and test relevant 
hypotheses, such as whether living with the husband’s family helps with married women’s 
schooling and whether parents use their financial resources and their social influence to help 
with their married daughter’s schooling. In addition, this research provides a unique 
 83 
 
perspective focusing on women’s characteristics to understand how Nepalese women 
combine family and student roles after marriage. Future research should bring men into the 
research and examine how husband’s characteristics and their family background have 
impacts on this social phenomenon.            
More specifically, this study finds that more educated women may be more likely to 
and also more able to follow this inventive pattern of combining family and student roles. 
Education not only means better economic prospects in the future, but also is important 
cultural capital. These women have both autonomy and resources, including cultural and 
financial resources to pursue advancement in family status and personal accomplishment. 
Being educated can both mean being “modernized” and being competent in employing 
cultural resources. However, it is important to be aware of potential endogeneity issues here. 
It is likely that some women may postpone their marriage until the completion of a university 
degree. The study sample includes all married women regardless of their education activities 
after marriage. Education still shows positive effects. Further, some college students may 
have to marry while in school due to parents’ concerns about their age. The result that these 
college students are more likely to continue education compared to their less educated 
counterparts nonetheless indicates that they may have more autonomy and higher status in 
the husband’s family. 
It also shows that women with an arranged marriage are usually more likely to 
continue schooling after marriage, compared to those with a love marriage. Those with an 
arranged marriage make compromises to historic culture and as a result have gains in their 
personal development. However, education reverses this pattern. For highly educated women, 
both those with combined and love marriages are more likely to pursue education after 
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marriage. Those with a combined marriage take the format of an arranged marriage, showing 
respect to local customs and cultural authorities, but are also able to keep their autonomy. 
The reverse effect of arranged versus love marriage on post-marriage schooling at the college 
education further reduces the endogeneity concerns: those college students with a love 
marriage may have higher autonomy compared to their counterparts with an arranged 
marriage and therefore are more likely to continue their education.   
The implication is that, in the transitional societies where historic culture dominates 
and cultural forces of industrialized and Western societies are gaining momentum, 
compromising between young people and cultural authorities and between cultural practices 
and westernizing influences can be practical and beneficial strategies. Those who are able to 
take advantage of the possibility of compromise can thrive and be the transforming forces in 
these societies.        
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Table 2.1. Descriptives of All Variables, IIMFBN, 2008 (N=1,705) 
Variables Mean 
Std. 
Error Minimum Maximum 
Post-Marriage Education 
Continuation 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Pre-Marriage Education Completion 0.4 0.49 0 1 
Parental Education 4.09 4.2 0 16 
Pre-Marriage Years of Schooling 7.95 4.92 0 21 
Marriage Type  
        Love Marriage (Ref) 0.3 0.46 0 1 
    Arranged Marriage 0.48 0.5 0 1 
    Combined Marriage  0.21 0.41 0 1 
Control Variables 
    Age 27.67 4.05 15 34 
Age at Marriage 18.51 3.14 7 30 
Number of Mother's Children 5.26 2.09 1 14 
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Table 2.2. Coefficients of Women's Characteristics on Their Post-marriage Education Continuation, IIMFBN, 2008 
Variables M1   M2   M3   M4   M5   M6   
Pre-marriage Education Completion 4.83 *** 4.72 *** 4.1 *** 4.79 *** 4.15 *** 4.1 *** 
Parental Education 
  
0.05 ** 
      
0.04 * 
Pre-marriage Years of Schooling 
    
0.16 * 
  
0.26 ** 0.14 * 
Marriage Type (Ref = Love Marriage) 
                Arranged Marriage 
      
0.26 
 
2.41 * 0.22 
     Combined Marriage  
      
0.39 + 0.66 
 
0.41 + 
Interaction Term 
            Pre-Marriage Schooling*Arranged Marriage 
        
0.19 * 
  Pre-Marriage Schooling*Combined Marriage 
        
0.03 
   Control Variables 
            Age 0.04 + 0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.04 + 0.03 
 
0.03 
 Age at Marriage 0.19 *** 0.17 *** 0.03 
 
0.18 *** 0.03 
 
0.04 
 
Number of Mother's Children -0.1 + 
-
0.08   
-
0.08   -0.1 + 
-
0.08   
-
0.07   
One tailed test 
            + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, and *** p<.001 
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CHAPTER 3 
WHY MARRY EARLY WHEN OTHERS WAIT? 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND MARITAL 
EXPECTATIONS AMONG AMERICAN YOUTH1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Profound changes in family behaviors have been occurring in the United States over 
the past few decades. The never-static American family has witnessed a continuously 
delayed entry into first marriage, a dramatic decline in marriage rates, a rapid increase in 
divorce rates and a sharp rise in nonmarital birth rates (Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2006; 
Teachman, Tedrow & Crowder, 2000). Median age at first marriage increased from 20 to 25 
during the period 1960 – 2003 for women and 23 to 27 for men during the same period 
(Lehrer, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). Among these changes, the increase in age at first 
marriage, as well as the decline in marriage rates has drawn considerable media and policy 
attention. In contrast, a small but significant number of Americans continue to marry at an 
early age. During the first few years of the current century, approximately one third of all 
women marry before age 24, while one fifth of these marriages end with divorce by the time 
these women reach the age of 24 (Schoen, Landale & Daniels, 2007).  
 The time between late teens and young adults is “demographically dense”: more 
transitions regarding family formation, education, and career occur during this period of 
time, compared to later stages of life (Rindfuss, 1991). According to Arnett (2000), young 
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people explore their identity, develop romantic relationships, and build career trajectories in 
preparation for adult roles during this “emerging adulthood,” the ages of 18 to 25 in current 
industrial societies. From the perspective of life course theory, any transition in this dense 
and emerging time early in life can have profound impact on young people’s socioeconomic 
achievement in their later life trajectories (Elder, 1981 & 1994). Early marriage is found to 
be associated with various negative outcomes in family behaviors and socioeconomic 
mobility in later years: higher rates of fertility (Teachman, Polonko & Leigh, 1987); marital 
instability (Booth, Rustenbach & McHale, 2008; Lehrer, 2008; Oppenheimer, 1988); lower 
educational attainment (Alexander & Reilly, 1981; Marini, 1985; Teachman, Polonko & 
Leigh, 1987) and occupational mobility (Otto, 1979).  
 Other studies found that minority and disadvantaged groups are more susceptible to 
early marriage formation. Examples include young people from lower social classes (Meier 
& Allen, 2008), those with low school performance and educational attainment (Glick, Ruf, 
White & Coldscheider , 2006), those from non-intact families (Bumpass, Castro-Martin & 
Sweet, 1991) and those with a Hispanic background (Glick et al., 2006; Teachman, Tedrow 
& Crowder, 2000). Further, the legacy of socioeconomic disadvantage is likely to be passed 
on to future generations through the process of family formation (Axinn & Thornton, 1992). 
The implications of early marriage formation for social inequality and stratification, 
therefore, are clear.  
 Research examining early marriage has declined dramatically after 1970s. The 
majority of the recent research on early marriage formation uses data either from the 1990s 
or the early few years of this century (Glick et al., 2006; Landale, Schoen & Daniels 2010; 
Lehrer, 2004; Johnson & Dye, 2005; Schoen, Landale & Daniels,  2007; South, 2001; 
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Wolfinger, 2003). Among the above research, much examines marriage formation together 
with other forms of union formation. Although the most commonly used covariates of family 
formation from the past literature, including demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
are still associated with entry into early marriage in the 21st century (Uecker & Stokes , 
2008; Landale, Schoen & Daniels, 2010), in-depth research (Schoen, Landale & Daniels, 
2007) and research using most recent data are in urgent need to better understand early 
marriage formation dynamics in the first decade of this century. To extend this observation 
on early family formation, this paper thus incorporates the legacy of both economic and 
cultural theories in the field of family studies to explore the underlying dynamics of early 
marriage formation (Becker, 1991; Goldscheider & Waite, 1986; MacDonald & Rindfuss, 
1981; Oppenheimer, 2000; Preston & Richards, 1975; Seltzer et al., 2005; Sweeney, 2002).  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 With respect to family formation, the economic approach usually examines the effect 
of education, employment, and income as indicators of economic resources on union 
formation and fertility. Past empirical research has demonstrated that economic resources are 
positively associated with marriage for both men and women (Bennett, Bloom & Craig, 
1990; Goldscheider & Waite, 1986; Goldstein & Kenney, 2001; Lichter, et al., 1992; 
McLaughlin & Lichter, 1997; Sweeny, 2002). The dynamics for women, however, are far 
more complicated than men’s. For women, effects of economic resources on marriage 
formation seem to be less strong than for men, and are not always significant (Carlson, 
McLanahan & England, 2004; Manning & Smock, 1995; Sassler & Schoen, 1999; Xie, et al., 
2003). Yet college educated women are constantly reported to be more likely to get married 
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than their less educated counterparts (Goldstein & Kenney, 2001). The inconsistent impact of 
economic resources on women’s marriage formation may be due to the fact that some women 
follow the social norm of acceptable gender roles to specialize in household production, 
rather than pursuing socioeconomic attainment (Becker, 1991; Carlson et al., 2004; Cherlin, 
1992; Xie et al., 2003). Past research also suggests that economic factors cannot fully explain 
disparities in marriage rates by race and ethnicity (Wilson, 1996). The pure economic 
perspective is, thus, not sufficient in explaining the complicated dynamics of marriage 
formation processes. 
In contrast to the “normative” timing of marriage, research reports that economic 
resources, such as family socioeconomic status, school performance, educational aspiration 
and achievement, are negatively associated with early marriage formation (Glick et al, 2006; 
Uecker & Stokes, 2008).  However, this is not in conflict with the economic approach. 
Young people with more economic potential tend to concentrate on their human capital 
investment early in life, and thus skip early marriage formation. However, once they have 
accumulated sufficient economic resources, such as completing college education and 
finding a professional occupation, they move to marry much faster.   
 Cultural theories of family formation greatly enrich the understanding of the 
motivations underlying marriage formation, in addition to the economic approach (Axinn & 
Thornton, 2000; Cherlin, 1992; Hochschild, 1989; Thornton, Axinn & Hill, 1992). Beliefs, 
values, and social norms are also reported to impact the timing of marriage. Positive attitudes 
and high expectations toward marriage and other promarriage ethos such as desires and 
aspirations are reported to be associated with more marriage formation (Brown, 2000; 
Carlson et al., 2004; Clarkberg, Stoltzenberg & Waite, 1995; Lichter, Batson & Brown, 
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2004; McGinnis, 2003; Sassler & Schoen, 1999; Waller & McLanahan, 2004). Sassler and 
Schoen (1999) find that men who are more approval of the gendered labor division--which 
requires men to focus on market jobs and women to focus on household production, are more 
likely to marry; however, it is not true for women. Furthermore, the conflict between 
women’s more egalitarian views and men’s less egalitarian views of gender relationship is 
reported to deter single mothers from marrying their children’s father (Edin, 2000). Many 
believe that the recent retreat from marriage, especially for those from low income groups, is 
partially due to the fact that low income people increasingly put high value and expectation 
on marriage. As the result, marriage becomes too expensive for them to afford (Bulcroft & 
Bulcroft, 1993; Edin & Kefalas, 2005; Gibson-Davis, Edin & McLanahan, 2005).  
 Along the line of cultural approach, Uecker and Stoke (2008) find the importance of 
religion is positively related to early marriage formation. Glick et al. (2006) suggest 
familisim can be employed in explaining high early marriage rates among Mexican girls and 
boys in the United States. Landale, Schoen, and Daniels (2010) report that young women 
who regard marriage as part of an ideal relationship and those who expect to marry early, are 
more likely to enter an early marriage.  
 Built upon the above two lines of research with respect to family formation, some 
research has explored the interplay between economic and ideational factors. White and 
Rogers (2000) posit a “possible period interaction,” whereby effects of economic resources 
appear to vary in different periods of time. This interaction is likely a reflection of the 
interaction between changed social norms (ideational factors) concerning marriage and 
economic factors. As Wilson (1996) notes, the weaker are the social norms disapproving 
premarital sex and nonmarital birth, and the stronger are the economic effects on marriage 
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formation. Furthermore, the effects of Black men’s economic resources on Black women’s 
marriage formation are stronger compared to previous cohorts (Testa & Krogh, 1995), and 
are also stronger compared to White women’s marriage formation (Bulcroft & Bulcroft, 
1993; South, 1991). This outcome is possibly reflected by both the changed norms of the 
marriage standard among Black women, and racial differences in the social norms 
concerning marriage. Some ethnographic research confirms that financial obstacles are the 
most important barrier preventing low income women from forming a marriage, in spite of 
their high hopes and expectations concerning marriage (Edin & Kefalas, 2005; Gibson-Davis 
et al., 2005). The implication is that for these women, to realize their marital expectation into 
an actual action is depending on how many economic resources either they or their partners 
possess. Therefore, an interactive approach which extends the two lines of research tradition 
and focuses on the interaction between economic and ideational factors, such as attitudes, 
expectations, and social norms can shed new light to the study of family formation. 
Furthermore, it can help to solve the failure of the pure economic approach in explaining 
family formation behaviors among some social groups.     
 In consistence with this interactive approach, in a study examining educational 
engagement and early family formation, Glick et al. (2006) identify an interaction between 
school engagement and race and ethnicity on early family formation. Mexican boys and girls 
with low school engagement or no school enrollment are more likely to form early marriage 
compared to other ethnic groups. The authors suggest that the social norms of ‘familism’ 
among Mexican Americans may affect their decision making and help them perceive school 
and family roles as more compatible. Therefore, the interactive approach extending research 
in general family formation can also apply to early family formation. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 This research uses a multidisciplinary approach, integrating perspectives from 
economics, social psychology, and sociology to examine how economic potential and early 
marriage expectation  and social norms favoring early marriage structure decision making 
concerning entry into early marriage. The economic approach including contributions from 
both economics and sociology (Becker, 1991; Oppenheimer, 1988) highlights the roles of 
economic resources and concerns about future economic certainty in the process of marriage 
formation. The psychological reasoned action theory is focused on the ideational dimension, 
including individuals’ intentions, attitudes, and subjective norms (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Sociological perspectives underlie the social norm of “being 
appropriate” in a relevant social context and emphasizes on social approval as reward, in 
contrast to economic incentives (Bourdieu, 1977; March, 1994; Montgomery, 1998). 
Therefore, the empirical question relevant to this paper becomes: what contribution can each 
of these perspectives make in disentangling the dynamics of the various motivations 
underlying an individual’s decision making concerning early marriage formation?   
Economic Theories 
 Established by Gary Becker (1991), the New Home Economics theory applies an 
individual rational choice approach to areas of family behaviors, including divorce, marriage, 
fertility and relationships between family members. This approach is well known as the 
“specialization and trading model” in the field of family studies. Linking activities at the 
microeconomic (individual) level to trends at the macro (societal/group) level, this approach 
assumes that individuals are forward-thinking, consistent in their behaviors and act to 
maximize their individual welfare. Correspondingly, men and women seek to maximize their 
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individual utility when forming a marital union based on gender specialization. For example, 
men specialize in the job market; women specialize in household production such as 
housework and childbearing. The two exchange the products of their respective 
specializations in the marriage. This approach, therefore, associates men’s economic 
resources with higher marriage rates, while a woman’s economic independence is claimed to 
account for marriage retreat.  
 Unconvinced by the specialization and trading model, Oppenheimer (1988 & 1997) 
proposes a search-theoretical model to explore the process of looking for a spouse, which 
suggests that the uncertainty of spouse candidates’ traits would increase search time. She 
emphasizes that the adults’ economic roles have systematic and important impact on 
marriage timing because work significantly structures individuals’ lifestyle in industrial 
societies. Following the gender role specialization model in the “traditional time” when 
women focus more on home production rather than on market work, a set of factors related to 
uncertainty of men’s future economic roles are significantly associated with marriage timing. 
However, as women increasingly participate in the labor market, a parallel set of factors 
related to uncertainty of women’s future economic roles add to the complexity of the spouse 
search process. Oppenheimer further explains that women’s economic resources do not buy 
economic independence from men, but increase gains to marriage by increasing economic 
interdependence between husband and wife via their contribution to the economic pool. 
Therefore, women’s economic roles increase the search time, resulting in postponed 
marriage. However, due to the gains to marriage, women’s economic roles encourage rather 
than deter marriage formation, which differs from what the rational choice approach claims. 
Oppenheimer’s contribution to the economic approach lies in the following aspects, 1) she 
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debunks the economic utility maximization approach, but never downplays the importance of 
economic factors and economic motivations (the “rational” motivation of an individual actor 
) in the process of marriage formation; 2) she illustrates the great complexity of how 
economic resources and concerns of future economic certainty  pattern marriage timing; and 
3) she switches the focus of the field of family studies from blaming women for marriage 
decline to equally and objectively evaluating both men and women’s economic resources on 
marriage formation.         
 The historical changes in family behaviors also support Oppenheimer’s theory (1988 
& 1997). During the era of the manufacturing economy in the 1950s, a man’s income was 
sufficient to support a family, while a woman had limited job market opportunities. The 
specialization model allows for utility maximization for both partners in a marriage in this 
social context of constrained opportunities for women. This type of conventional marriage in 
the 1950s, promoting men as the single breadwinner in the family, was also supported by the 
social norms of the time (Cherlin, 2005; White & Rogers, 2000). This support provided 
additional affirmation for the married couple. With the economy restructuring from 1970s, 
women’s job opportunities and income have increased significantly. In contrast, young men 
and men with less educated have experienced a considerable decrease in employment rates 
and income (White & Rogers, 2000). As the dual-earner family became the norm and stood 
to gain the most benefit in the economic restructuring (White & Rogers, 2000), it would be 
unwise and less viable to sacrifice a second income to specialize on household production. 
Both men and women’s economic resources can thus facilitate marriage formation. 
 Drawing from the life course perspective (Elder, 1981 & 1994), individuals make 
decisions about family formation and career establishment during the transition from 
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adolescence to young adulthood. The timings of career and early family formation are 
usually in conflict during this period. Accumulation of human capital for career building, 
such as education, work experience and training of special skills, usually requires an 
intensive and long-term investment. Correspondently, young men and women who are 
competent in school and have high expectation of college education may regard early family 
formation as bearing a too high opportunity cost. Although their later economic resources can 
eventually facilitate their family formation, they would thus postpone entry into early 
marriage for these long term benefits.  
Hypothesis I:  
Adolescents with better economic potential will be less likely to enter early marriage, 
compared to their less promising counterparts. 
Social Psychological Theories of Reasoned Action  
 Fishbein’s and Ajzen’s (1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) theory of reasoned action 
claims that an individual’s behavior is determined by his or her intention to engage in a 
certain behavior. An individual’s intention is a function of their attitudes and subjective 
norms. An individual’s attitude refers to his or her evaluation of a potential outcome (Becker, 
1991). A subjective norm is the perception of “significant others’” acceptance of one’s 
behavior. Here the term “norm” embeds individuals in their personal relationships or network 
with important others, which is a significant difference from Gary Becker’s purely individual 
perspective. Relevant to intentions to perform certain behaviors, expectations can also predict 
relevant behaviors. Further, individuals’ attitudes and subjective norms can also influence 
their specific expectations concerning certain action. Applying this perspective to early 
marriage formation, young adults’ expectations of marrying early are, therefore, associated 
with their actual marital behaviors.  
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Hypothesis II:  
Adolescents with higher expectations of early marriage will be more likely to marry 
at early ages, compared to their counterparts with lower expectations.  
 
Social Norm Theories: The Logic of Consequence versus the Logic of Appropriateness 
 Some sociologists extend rational choice theory to explore motivations underlying 
social behaviors from the perspective of role theory (March, 1994; Montgomery, 1998). 
Corresponding to the social roles they play in the social context, individuals either follow 
“the logic of appropriateness” (social norms) to act reasonably, or follow “the logic of 
consequence” to rationally maximize utility. For example, following “the logic of 
appropriateness,” a friend is obligated to cooperate to obey social norms. However, following 
the logic of consequence, a business man calculates costs and benefits to maximize utility 
(Montgomery, 1998). Or put it in a modified way, standing in his professional role, the 
business man is allowed to follow his rational facet of his being and focus on pursuing 
economic gains.  
The above role expectation following is consistent with social norm obedience which 
can be understood as an extension of the subjective norm motivation proposed by Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Moreover, social norms are not just bounded by a 
narrow social role or an aggregate of personal relationships. They are relevant to a specific 
social context, in which individuals pursue approvals and avoid sanctions by the society. A 
social norm compliant chooses to behave appropriately in specific social contexts for social 
approval, instead of solely focused on economic gains (Bourdieu, 1977). Therefore, both 
economic consideration and social norm obedience can motivate an individual’s decision 
making regarding a certain action.  
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 Take a real life context as an example to illustrate how both economic concerns and 
social norms obedience can work to impact early marriage formation here. A young woman 
grows up in a neighborhood where early marriage is the norm. She thus may likely perceive 
this pro-early-marriage ethos and may also consider forming an early marriage sometime in 
the future. However, it merits discussion here that social norm is a more aggregate concept at 
the group, community or societal level, in contrast to individual characteristics such as 
attitudes or beliefs. Its impact on young people’s behaviors at the individual level can operate 
through complex mechanisms. The regression techniques to regress main effects of social 
norms may not be able to detect the direct effects. In the following section of “an Interactive 
Framework,” I will conduct a more theoretical discussion concerning the possible ways 
social norms shape individuals’ behaviors through their actual decision making process.    
Hypothesis III:  
Adolescents who live in social contexts where social norms favor early marriage will 
more likely marry at relatively early ages, compared to those living in social contexts 
where social norms do not favor early marriage.  
An Interactive Framework: economic vs. non-economic motivation interaction 
 For the above discussion, we can see that the dynamics of decision making regarding 
early marriage formation involves not only economic considerations, but also attitudes or 
expectations and certain social norms. Here, I argue that whether individuals act solely for 
economic gains or not is conditional on their beliefs, attitudes, and expectations with respect 
to the concerned action, and on the prevailing social norms in their social contexts. In other 
words, individuals’ attitudes and expectations and social norms serve to modify or condition 
the “rational” aspect (economic concerns) of an individual’s decision making process. 
Because individuals embedded in particular social contexts usually have a set of attitudes and 
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expectations, they would make decisions by balancing “motivations of being appropriate” 
versus “motivations of pursuing economic gains.” Specifically, the motivation of being 
appropriate functions as a conditional and regulatory force to modify the motivation of 
pursuing economic gains. 
 Therefore, the integrative framework of this study argues that both economic and 
non-economic motivations are elements inside an individual’s “tool kit1” box for decision 
making concerning a certain behavior or action. These two motivations are dependent on 
each other. Economic motivations can suppress effects of non-economic ones when the two 
are in conflict. For example, a young woman is certain about going to college and attaining a 
bachelor’s degree and also aspires to marry before 20 years old. Considering the possible 
conflicts between school and family responsibilities, she may choose to complete college 
education before marriage. Further, economic motivations can also strengthen effects of non-
economic ones when the two are compatible. Take another example, a young man from a 
humble family background believes in the American dream and works hard to achieve a 
middle class lifestyle. He also fancies marrying one day in his life. His actual achieving of 
the middle class status can speed up his moving to marriage.  
Furthermore, social norms as aggregate influences are different from individual 
attitudes or expectations. I’d like to use game chips and rules to illustrate how the two may 
work through different mechanisms. If individual non-economic attitudes can add a chip to 
the game in addition to the chip of economic concerns, then social norms can change the rule 
of the game. More specifically, social norms can shape the way how individuals perceive 
costs and gains concerning marriage formation. As the result, individuals can actively 
reformulate the perceived costs and gains of certain behaviors to be compatible with social 
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norms. For example, in a neighborhood where early marriage is socially favorable, it is thus 
deemed as rewarding or even associated with a certain status achievement. It is then not 
perceived as bearing a high opportunity cost compared to socioeconomic upward mobility. 
Therefore, an individual not only perceives early marriage and upward social mobility as 
compatible rather than as in conflict, but also take actions to make them happen: a college 
student from this social context may choose to marry early and continue the college 
education at the same time.   
A few things merit notion here. First, commonly used socioeconomic factors in 
family studies, such as education, educational aspiration or expectation, employment, 
income, and economic potential may represent more economic related motivations in respect 
to marriage formation. However, they are not measures of economic motivations, but 
contribute to the understanding of economic motivations. Similarly, many ideational factors 
such as attitudes, aspirations, expectations, and social norms regarding marriage formation 
reflect more non-economic related motivations, but are not direct measures of that. Second, 
ideational factors do not always represent non-economic motivations. They can be about 
economic concerns; for example, aspiration of a middle class income in the future. Because 
they reflect economic related motivations, this paper thus treats this type of indicator as 
economic factors rather than ideational factors. Third, economic and non-economic 
motivations can both be in conflict and also be compatible in respect to marriage formation. 
It is important to note that social norms can either facilitate or deter individuals to make these 
two motivations compatible. Social norms this study discusses are understood as norms 
regulated in different social contexts that are relevant to different social boundaries, such as 
community. However, the social boundaries can also be extended beyond physical limits to 
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the social division along the lines of gender, race and ethnicity, social class and religion. 
Fourth, the term of interaction refers to a mutual dependence. For example, an interaction 
between educational expectation and social norms on family formation can be interpreted as 
either the effect of social norms depending on educational expectation or the effect of 
educational expectation depending on social norms. For convenience and consistence, this 
paper describes interactions between economic potential and ideational influence as 
economic potential dependent on ideational influence.    
Hypothesis IV:  
The effect on early marriage formation of adolescents’ economic potential is 
dependent on their early marriage expectations. For those who have lower 
expectations of early marriage, economic potential will have no effect on early 
marriage formation; whereas for those with higher early marriage expectations, 
economic potential will have a negative effect.  
and, Hypothesis V:  
The effect on early marriage formation of social norms favoring early marriage is 
dependent on adolescents’ economic potential. For those who live in social contexts 
where early marriage is the norm, economic potential will have a positive effect on 
early marriage formation; whereas for their counterparts, economic potential will 
have a positive effect.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
 The data I use to test the hypotheses comes from the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent Health (Add Health). The Add Health data was collected from a nationally 
representative sample of youth in grades 7 through 12 in the United States (Bearman et al., 
1997; Harris et al., 2003). A total of 145 schools were selected, including 80 high schools 
and their feeder middle schools. The sample was stratified by region (suburban, urban, or 
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rural), school type (public, private, or parochial), ethnic mix, and school size. Four waves of 
data collection have been completed. Between 1994 and 1995, 20,745 adolescents in grade 7 
through 12 were recruited for the Wave I in-home survey. The Wave IV in-home survey was 
conducted between 2008 and 2009 and included 15,701 individuals who were 24-35 years 
old at the time of interview, with more than 98% percent of respondents between 26 and 32 
years old. 
This study uses data from Waves I and IV. All the independent variables are from 
Wave I when respondents were in grades 7 through 12. Data from the in-home and in-school 
surveys are merged with census data provided by Add Health data. The dependent variable, 
timing of early marriage, comes from Wave IV. I dropped 905 cases due to lacking of valid 
sample weights. An additional 5 respondents who married under 15 years of age were 
excluded, leaving a final study sample of 14,801. Missing values for all variables were 
imputed using indicator/dummy variable adjustment except specified in the text (Cohen, 
Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003).  
Measurements 
Timing of Marriage. The dependent variable is timing of early marriage, marrying before 22. 
It is measured by the question “In what month [and year] were you married?” Month is used 
as the unit of analysis for the hazard of marriage. Because this study investigates early 
marriage, I use the age 22 as the upper bound for age at first marriage. There are two reasons 
to employ this cutoff point: 1) According to the developmental perspective, the age range 
between 18 and 25 is a transition period from adolescent to adulthood when young people in 
industrialized societies explore and experiment to form their identity and prepare for career 
(Arnett, 2000). Forming a marriage right in the middle of this period at age 22 would seem 
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“early” when others are still exploring and experimenting different roles. 2) The age 22 is 
used as a “middle-class bias” because 22 is a typical age at college graduation. Accordingly, 
marriage before this age means either incompletion of college or no starting of professional 
career, and is thus “normatively” early in a middle class lens (Lowe & Witt, 1984; Uecker & 
Stoke, 2008)2. 3) As recent as 2003, the median age at first marriage is 25 for women and 27 
for men (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). The age of 22 years would be thus regarded early. 
Therefore, to examine young men and women’s early marital formation behaviors, the 
observation time starts from age 15 until either the respondent gets married or reaches age 
22, whichever arrives first. Accordingly, respondents who married after 22 are censored at 
the time of age 22. 
Measures of Economic Potential. For measures of economic potential, I take into 
consideration that adolescents usually are neither completely economically independent nor 
well established in their careers. Xie and et al. (2003) argues that an individual’s long term 
economic potential is theoretically more significant than his/her current income when making 
long term decisions concerning marriage. The decisions are based not only on their past and 
current income but also unobservable expectations concerning future income streams. To 
approximate an adolescent’s economic potential, I use measures of school performance and 
expectations regarding attending college. I take the average of math and English scores to 
measure school performance. The higher scores indicate better school performance. For those 
who had missing values either in math or English, I use whichever of the two variables has a 
valid score to measure grade. The expectation to attend college is measured by the question 
“how likely is it that you will go to college?” The responses are on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 
 105 
 
is low and 5 is high. I transform the answers to probabilities of going to college: 0%, 25%, 
50%, 75%, and 100%.  
Measures of Expectations of Early Marriage. Individual’s early marriage expectations are 
measured by the question “What do you think are the chances that each of the following 
things will happen to you?” The responses to “You will be married by age 25” include: (1) 
almost no chance, (2) some chance, but probably not, (3) a 50-50 chance, (4) a good chance, 
and (5) almost certain. I convert the 5-scale answers to probabilities of 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 
and 100%. This is the closest measure for early marriage expectation from Add Health data. 
It is possible that those who expect to marriage by age 25 may do so by marrying by age 24 
rather than 21. Therefore, this measure underestimates the effect of early marriage 
expectation by age 22 to some degree. The real effect of early marriage expectation by age 
22 would be more significant and stronger if there is an effect with the measure of early 
marriage expectation by age 25.   
Measures of Social Norms concerning Early Marriage. The social norms associated with 
early marriage are measured at the aggregate level: the school and neighborhood levels. 
Much previous research relates the nonintact family to early marriage (Axinn & Thornton 
1992; Goldscheider & Goldscheider 1998; McLanahan & Bumpass 1988; McLeod 1991; 
Thornton 1991; Waite & Spitze 1981). Wolfinger (2003) further specify that children from 
divorced family are more likely to form a marriage by age 20 but not after that. If parental 
divorce is related to early marriage formation, ideally, high proportion of divorced parents in 
the neighborhood would catch the dynamics of the correspondingly high rates of early 
marriage. Therefore, the proportion of divorced parents can approximate whether early 
marriage is normative or not or "how normative" in the neighborhood. Following this logic, 
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this can be used as a measure to approximate neighborhood norms favoring early marriage. 
However, Add Health data did not provide information about parental divorce when 
respondents were in grades 7 through 12 in 1994 and 1995. The closest measure I can get is 
to construct the proportion of single parents in social contexts where they live. 
 I thus calculate the proportion of single mother families at each school to approximate 
school norms favoring early marriage2. This calculation is based on the constructed variable 
of family structure (Harris, 1999). For the neighborhood norms, it is measured at the census 
tract level, which most research regards as the neighborhood where daily activities occur 
(Harris & Ryan, 2004). It is approximated by the proportion of female headed households 
with children but no husband present among all family households (to save space, in the 
following writing, school norms favoring early marriage and neighborhood norms favoring 
early marriage are referred as school norms and neighborhood norms, respectively). High 
values of single mother family proportions either at a school district or a census tract mean 
more approval of early marriage in the relevant social contexts. 
  Two concerns merit notion here. 1) If only marriage as early as before 20 is affected 
by nonintact family structure, the effect of the above two social norm measures on early 
marriage by 22 is likely to be less strong and significant than the effect on early marriage by 
20. 2) If only divorce affects offspring’s early marriage, the measure built upon single mother 
family can underestimate the effect on early marriage formation of social norms favoring 
early marriage.    
Control Variables. I control for age, gender, race and ethnicity, birth country, language 
spoken at home, and parental socioeconomic status. I use age from Wave IV, subtracting 
birth time from interview time, because age for some respondents from Wave I is incorrect. 
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For gender, females are codes as 1 and males as 0. Further I use the variable from Wave IV 
because the one from Wave I has two missing values.  Race and ethnicity includes the 
following categories: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, Asian and Pacific islander, 
Native American, Hispanic, non-Hispanic multiple race and others, with non-Hispanic white 
as the reference category (To save space, they are referred as white, black, Asian, Native 
American, Hispanic, multiple race and others). I code those who were born in the United 
States or came to the United States before 1 year old as 1 and others as 0. Non-English 
language spoken at home is codes as 1 and English as 0.  
  Parental socioeconomic status is measured by residential parents’ education, 
employment, and family income. Parental education is calculated by higher education level 
of the two parents, and is collapsed into five categories: less than high school, high school, 
some college, college and above, and also a missing category, with college and above as the 
reference category. Parental employment status measures whether respondents’ parents 
worked for pay at the interview time of Wave I and the past 12 months, including: neither 
working for pay, either working for pay, both working for pay and a missing category, with 
both working for pay as the reference category. Family income is coded into 5 categories: 
under poverty (<=$16,000 per year), close to poverty ($16,000 - $32,000), well above 
poverty ($32,000 - $50,000), middle class and above income (>=$50,000) and a missing 
category, with middle class and above income as the reference category.  
Analytic Strategies  
 This study uses event history analysis to examine data. Discrete-time hazard models 
are used to examine the influence of covariates on the monthly risk of marrying. Each 
individual has multiple cases of time (months) from age 15 until he/she marries or reaches 
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age 22, whichever goes first, and those who marry in the first month only have a single case 
of time. The hazard model employs the following equation to estimate the monthly risk of 
getting married,  
(1) Log (p/1-p)=β0+Xkβk , 
where X is the vector of explanatory variables and β is the vector of parameters of the 
explanatory variables. The analysis unit is person-months. By exponentiating β, the result 
represents an odds ratio, which approximates the probability of those getting married versus 
the probability of those not yet getting married. The odds ratio is equivalent to the hazard in 
the Cox proportional-hazard model: a hazard equal to one represents no effect, less than one 
represents a negative effect and greater than one represents a positive effect on early 
marriage timing.  
I first examine the main effects of economic potential, individual early marriage 
expectation, and school and neighborhood norms favoring early marriage. After that, the 
interaction effects between economic potential and ideational measures are estimated. I 
employ PROC SURVEYLOGISTIC with SAS 9.1 to estimate discrete-time hazard models. 
The SURVEY LOGISTIC procedure is thus adopted to deal with the weights, strata, and 
clustering issues of Add Health data.   
   
RESULTS 
 Table 3.1 presents weighted descriptive of this study. About 15% of respondents 
eventually got married before 22 years old by the end of Wave IV of Add Health. The 
average score of school performance was 3.76. Respondents’ average value of expectation of 
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going to college was 85%. The mean expectation of marrying by age 25 was 56%, slightly 
above the category of “a 50-50 chance.” The average of the proportion of single mother 
family households among all households was 21% for each school and 10% for each census 
tract. There were 49% females versus 51% males. The average age of respondents was 29 by 
the end of Wave IV. There were 66% whites, 15% blacks, 3% Asians and 12% Hispanics in 
the study sample. About 5% of respondents were born out of the United States, and another 
7% spoke a language other than English at home. There were slightly more than one third of 
respondents whose parents had “college and above education”, slightly less than one third 
whose parents had “high school education” and another one fifth whose parents had some 
college education. For the majority of respondents (59%), both parents worked for pay, and 
for slightly more than one third of respondents, only one parent worked for pay. Slightly less 
than one third of respondents’ families lived either under poverty or close to poverty and a 
similar proportion of respondents’ families had “middle class or above income”. 
Table 3.2 presents Models 1 through 7 that estimate independent effects of economic 
potential, early marriage expectation, and social norms favoring early marriage on entry into 
early marriage. Model 1 is the baseline model including all control variables. Women’s 
hazards of early marriage are 2 times of that of men’s.  Age does not show an effect, maybe 
due to the inclusion of the observation time. The hazards to marry before 22 are about 60% 
lower for both Blacks and Asians, compared to whites, whereas Hispanics and multiracial 
respondents are not significantly different from whites. The low early marriage formation 
rates for blacks are consistent with their overall low marriage rates; the lower rates of early 
marriage for Asians may reflect their postponing to entering marriage until their certain level 
of socioeconomic achievement, considering their overall marriage rates are not remarkably 
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low. The lack of significant difference between Hispanics and whites suggests that their pro-
marriage ethos may cancel out the effect of their lower economic status on early marriage 
formation. Further, where a respondent was born or what language he or she speaks at home 
does not seem to impact early marriage formation.  
Respondents whose parents had “less than high school” education have a hazard 90%  
higher  to form an early marriage, those whose parents had “high school” education have a 
hazard 70% higher, and those whose parents had “some college” education” have a hazard 
64% higher, compared to those whose parents had “college and above” education. Parental 
employment does not have much effect although it tends to have positive effects. When it 
comes to family income, those with “under poverty” income, “close to poverty” income and 
those with “well above poverty” income have higher hazards to form an early marriage, 
compared to those with “middle class and above” income: the margins are 56%, 75% and 
80%, respectively. The general message from the effects of parental education and family 
income is that the middle class family tends to protect their offspring from early marriage 
formation. Overall, early marriage formation seems to have markedly different patterns 
among people of different sexes, with different race and ethnic and class backgrounds. 
Considering much research associating early marriage to negative outcome in later life 
trajectory, this has significant implications on the status quo in the society and the 
perpetuation of the current social stratification system in the United States.  
Models 2 and 3 show that both school performance and educational expectation deter 
early marriage formation. The hazards of having early marriage (64%) for respondents who 
had a highest score of 5 for school performance are 20% lower than that (84%) for those who 
had a lowest grade of 2. Whereas, early marriage hazards of respondents who were 100% 
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certain about going to college are about one third lower than that of those who were 0% 
certain about going to college. In Model 4, expectation of early marriage has a significantly 
positive and strong effect on early marriage formation. Those who were 100% certain about 
expecting an early marriage have early marriage hazards that are almost 3 times than that of 
those who were 0% certain about marrying early. Remember, the variable of marital 
expectation from Add Health is measured by expecting to marry by age 25.  If we have a 
measure of marital expectation by age 22, its effect would be stronger. Neither school nor 
neighborhood norms regarding early marriage have any direct effects on early marriage 
formation, as shown in Models 5 and 6. However, these were expected in the “Theoretical 
Framework and Hypotheses” section of this paper. To prove relevant, the significant 
interaction effects between social norms and economic potential that I will discuss later 
indicate a complicated mechanism connecting social norms and early marriage formation.  
Model 7 is the full model. Effects of all control variables remain similar. The effects 
for both black and Asians and that for parental education tend to be slightly weaker. It is 
possible that socioeconomic and cultural factors tend to entangle with race and ethnicity to 
shape the trajectory to early marriage. Future research is needed to untangle the underlying 
patterns. Economic potential and early marriage expectation have similar effects compared to 
single effect models. Yet, the effects of school and neighborhood norms regarding marriage 
become stronger while remaining insignificant.  
Table 3.3 reports significant interactions between educational expectation and early 
marriage expectation and social norms favoring early marriage. Unfortunately, school 
performance does not seem to interact with the above ideational measures. It is likely that 
school performance as a more objective measure may not capture as much the dynamics of 
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economic motivations relevant to early marriage formation as measures such as educational 
expectation and school engagement. Therefore, school performance is also less likely to 
capture the interplay between the economic and non-economic motivations.  
Because it is less intuitive to interpret interaction effects directly from numbers from 
Table 3, I use Figures 1 through 3 to present interactions between educational expectation 
and early marriage expectation and social norms favoring early marriage as reported in Table 
3: the figures show patterns of changes in odds ratio when educational expectation increases 
for respondents holding different early marriage expectation and for those who lived in 
different social contexts where social norms regarding early marriage vary.  
  Figure 3.1 shows that educational expectation tends to lower early marriage rates for 
those who were expecting early marriage in a more affirmative way (early marriage 
expectation = 75% and 100%). It is possible that the stronger one is motivated for a college 
education, or a middle class income in the future, the more like he/she perceives early 
marriage as bearing high opportunity cost. Therefore, one is less likely to marry early. Here, 
economic concerns seem to suppress the motivation to marry early. The slopes of the line are 
steeper for those who were more affirmative about early marriage expectation: educational 
expectation suppresses the effects on early marriage formation more for these young people. 
Compared to respondents with relatively high early marriage expectation, for those who were 
not taking sides about early marriage expectation (early marriage expectation = 50%), the 
effects of educational expectation become more moderate on early marriage formation.  
The above interactions suggest that when economic concerns (reflected by 
educational expectation) and non-economic concerns (reflected by early marriage 
expectation) are in conflict, they tend to suppress each other’s effects. Apparently, forming 
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an early marriage is in conflict with the timing of attending college and gaining a higher 
education degree. Therefore, if an individual desires an early marriage, the stronger he/she 
aspires higher education, and the more likely he/she is going to delay the marriage.  
A different scenario occurs when individuals have relatively low expectations of 
marrying early (early marriage expectation = 0% and 25%). We can see that educational 
expectation does not have much effect. It is not surprising. For those who did not expect to 
marry as early as before age 22, there is no conflict between their marriage and education 
agendas. Correspondingly, the economic and non-economic motivations are not in conflict. 
Educational expectation does not affect early marriage formation for this group of young 
people at this stage of life; it is consistent with the scenario that they are likely to have higher 
rates of marriage after they achieve their educational goals at a later stage of life. Overall, 
when the motivation concerning getting married early is not in conflict with economic 
concerns, educational expectation does not have much effect. Whereas, when the motivation 
of getting married early is in conflict with economic concerns, educational expectation thus 
suppresses the former.  
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show similar interaction patterns on early marriage formation 
between educational expectation and school and neighborhood norms. For those who went to 
schools or lived in neighborhoods where early marriages were less favored (school norms = 
0% and 15%; neighborhood norms = 0%), educational expectation is negatively related to 
early marriage formation. For those who went to school where early marriage is more 
favored or tolerant (school norms = 30%, 45% and 60%; neighborhood norms = 30%, 45%, 
60% and 75%), educational expectation speeds up entry into early marriage, and the more 
early marriage is socially approved, the stronger is the effect of educational expectation. 
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It is likely that in social contexts where social norms do not favor early marriage, 
individuals likely have more negative impressions on early marriage, and perceive it as an 
obstacle for social mobility in adult life. Early marriage thus bears a high opportunity cost 
with respect to socioeconomic attainment in young adulthood. Therefore, educational 
expectation deters early marriage formation in these social contexts.  
However, in social contexts where social norms favor early marriages, individuals are 
likely have more positive impressions on early marriage, and perceive it as socially and 
culturally rewarding. Early marriage formation and pursuing education and career are both 
deemed as accomplishments of life and regarded compatible with each other. Therefore, 
educational expectation speeds up early marriage formation in these social contexts.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 The above results suggest that the more promising is individuals’ economic potential, 
and the less likely they will enter an early marriage. Further, the greater individuals expect to 
marry early, and the more likely they will actually do so. This suggests that both economic 
and non-economic motivations shape young people’s trajectory to early marriage. Moreover, 
when individuals are highly motivated to marry early, the economic motivation relative to 
upward social mobility in the future suppresses the early marriage motivation on actually 
forming an early marriage. Yet when individuals are not much motivated to marry early, 
educational expectation seems to lose the effects on early marriage. However, it is not 
because economic motivation does not impact individuals' marriage behaviors. The dynamics 
are due to the fact that these young people are more motivated by socioeconomic mobility 
rather marrying early, they thus postpone marriage. The interactions between individual level 
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characteristics support the first mechanism I proposed in the “Theoretical Framework and 
Hypotheses” section: when economic and non-economic motivations are in conflict, one can 
suppress the other’s effect in the process of individuals’ decision making, early marriage 
formation in this study.      
Although both school and neighborhood norms did not show direct effect on early 
marriage formation, their interactions with educational expectation support the second 
mechanism I proposed in the “Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses” section: social norms 
can shape how individuals’ evaluate costs and benefits of early marriage in relation to their 
economic prospect. When social norms support early marriage, marrying early is considered 
as rewarding and compatible with human capital investment for future socioeconomic 
mobility. As a result, high education expectation speeds up early marriage formation. When 
social norms are less approval of early marriage, marrying early is thus considered as bearing 
a high opportunity and thus not compatible with human capital investment for future 
socioeconomic mobility. Accordingly, high educational expectation thus deters early 
marriage formation.  
 Moreover, the interactions between social norms and individual educational 
expectation also suggest that social norms, culture, and other neighborhood level influences 
may influence behaviors through individual characteristics. And that is why although 
neighborhood effects are regarded as theoretically and sociologically important, statistical 
effects are not always found. Interactions between neighborhood and individual 
characteristics can be a very promising approach to explore the dynamics. 
 
CONCLUSION 
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 This research synthesizes the economic approach from economics and sociology, the 
psychological reasoned action approach, and the sociological social norm perspective. 
Drawing on previous studies in both economic and ideational approaches in studies of family 
formation, it proposes an integrative framework that explores how economic and ideational 
factors, including social norms and expectation regarding early marriage interactively shape 
young people’s decision making concerning early marriage formation. It extends to the 
legacies of economic and cultural approaches in the field of family studies. It further sheds 
light to the understanding of how economic and non-economic motivations shape a wide 
range of family behaviors, and how social norms shape individuals’ evaluation of certain 
social behaviors as rewarding or as bearing high opportunity cost in different social contexts.  
 However, it deserves attention here that decision-making of marriage is usually a 
joint one confounded with that of cohabitation and childbearing. More marriages are 
preceded by cohabitations in recent decades. Therefore, young people felt social pressure to 
get married due to early pregnancy and they feel less of that now with the option of 
cohabitation. Therefore, early marriage is even more intriguing in this changing context of 
marriage, cohabitation and childbearing. Hence, the focus of this paper is early marriage. 
Future research on early marriage along this line should also take cohabitation into 
consideration to examine how experience of cohabitation may affect individuals’ economic 
and noneconomic concerns regarding marriage formation.   
 
Second, economic theories in family behavior implicitly assess the economic 
attractiveness of individuals on the marriage market from the standpoint of a spouse searcher. 
In this study, the measures of a youth’s economic potential are less observable by others (Xie 
et al., 2003). By estimating the effects of economic potential, this study offers an alternative 
 117 
 
approach to the study of marriage formation to investigate the motivations of the individual 
who is faced with the decision making about whether and when to marry, rather than from a 
spouse searcher’s standpoint who evaluates or judges this individuals’ attractiveness in the 
marriage market.        
        Third, many studies incorporate attitudinal and cultural norms when examining 
marriage formation. Among these studies, some only look at individual attitudes without 
inspecting broader cultural norms. Others examine both individual attitudes and cultural 
norms, while cultural norms are usually approximated at the individual level. This paper 
examines both an individual’s own early marriage expectation at the individual level and 
social norms concerning early marriage at the aggregate level, the school and neighborhood 
levels.  
 Yet we should be cautious about interpreting the effects of marital expectation. It is 
possible that adolescents may have different marital expectation due to different family 
background, early childhood family history, their performance in academia and other 
dimensions, and their other characteristics. Unfortunately, due to the limitation of data, we 
don’t have longitudinal to control for these unobserved characteristics. Although marital 
expectation may not be the ultimate cause leading to early marriage formation, the above 
unobserved effects may shape individuals’ attitudes toward early marriage. Therefore, 
marital expectation can partially capture the dynamics of marital attitudes. We have reason to 
believe that the effect is in the right direction, but the magnitude can be modified due to 
possible conflicting effects among the unobserved characteristics. It is thus important to keep 
in mind to interpret this relationship as association rather than causation and this association 
is moderated by one’s economic potential.      
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Last, this research has implications for understanding the complicated patterns of 
early marriage formation specially and marriage formation in general among different social 
groups and in different cultural contexts. It discards the traditional way to homogeneously 
assume that economic factors tend to have same or similar effects on marriage formation 
across social groups and culture. Social norm in this study is regarded as a complex concept 
which is contextually relevant. Different social groups defined by different social boundaries, 
such as gender, race and ethnicity, social class, immigration status, religious affiliation and 
so on. The theoretical approach and findings of this study thus have special implications on 
further investigating different patterns of family formation among different racial and ethnic 
groups, such as blacks, Hispanics and whites, among social groups of different class 
background and among men and women. Further, it is important to apply this theoretical 
approach to different culture contexts to further understanding how effects of economic 
factors can vary in different contexts.       
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____________________ 
Notes 
1. This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan 
Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the 
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with 
cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies and foundations. Special 
acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the 
original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on the 
Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was received 
from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis. 
2. The economic vs. non-economic motivation interaction framework can be understood in 
Sewell’s (1999) and Swidler’s (1986 & 2001) culture schemas. As Sewell argues, culture is 
the dynamic conversation between “a system of symbols and meanings” and “the concept of 
practice.” The system loosely and thinly “hang(s) together,” and provides “a semiotic code.”  
Faced with different situations, individual actors can selectively use the coding system to 
develop means to address and solve problems in practice. As I understand, Swindler’s 
reading of culture as “strategies of action,” “tool kit” and a “repertoire” is not in conflict with 
Sewell's practice which is guided by the coding system of “symbols and meanings.” We can 
understand that Sewell’s “semiotic code” can help to provide or develop Swidler’s “tool kit.”  
Nonetheless, Swidler provides a more detailed and convincing description of how culture 
influences action.  
        In my economic vs. non-economic motivation interaction framework, attitudes, 
expectations, beliefs, subjective and social norms belong to or are influenced by the culture 
coding system of “symbols and meanings.” This system is fluid, negotiable and operates as a 
supreme coding system. Individuals use the cultural coding, take consideration of economic 
needs and characteristics of various situations, and thus create the “tool kit” and “strategies 
of action.” To put this more specifically, in different social contexts, different social norms 
and cultural beliefs can shape the way individuals perceive costs and gains of certain action. 
Therefore different formulas are developed by individual actors. These different formulas can 
be understood as Swidler’s “tool kit” and “strategies of action.” With more experiences in 
various situations, individual actors can accumulate a larger repertoire.  
However, different from Sewell and Swidler, this framework distinguishes economic 
motivations from non-economic ones. Following the Weberian tradition, this framework 
continues the conversation between rationality (related to something utilitarian or material) 
and culture (related to meaning and purpose).  
3. To approximate the school level social norms regarding early marriage, I also calculated 
the school level proportion of residential mothers who married before the age of 18. 
Unfortunately, there is a large number of missing values among residential mothers’ age at 
first marriage. I compared the distributions of all variables from the study sample and that 
from the reduced sample which includes only respondents who have valid values of their 
mothers’ age at first marriage. The distributions are almost identical. I further ran the same 
statistical models as used in this paper for both the study sample and the reduced sample. A 
significant interaction and similar patterns are found between educational expectation and 
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mother’s early marriage at the school level for both samples. The result from the reduced 
sample supports Hypothesis V and thus is presented as a graph in Appendix 1. As shown in 
Figure 3.4 in Appendix 3.1, the pattern is similar to Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Educational 
expectation is positively associated with early marriage formation for respondents from 
schools where high proportions of mothers married at young ages (school proportions of 
mothers’ early marriage = 30%, 40%, 50% and 60%, respectively); and the effect of 
educational expectation is negative on early marriage formation for respondents from schools 
where fewer mothers married at younger ages (school proportions of mothers’ early marriage 
= 0%, 10% and 20%, respectively). More detailed results can be provided upon request from 
the author.          
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Table 3.1. Weighted Descriptive Statistics, Add Health (N = 14,801) 
Variables Weighted Mean 
Std. Error of 
Weighted 
Mean 
Range 
Married before age 22 0.15 0.01 0-1 
Economic Potential 
     School performance 3.76 0.02 2-5 
  Educational expectation 0.85 0.01 0-1 
Early Marriage Expectation and 
Norms 
     Early marriage expectation 0.56 0.01 0-1 
  School norms  0.21 0.01 0-0.58 
  Neighborhood norms  0.1 0.01 0-0.81 
Control Variables 
   Time 80.2 0.24 1-84 
Gender (Ref = Male) 0.49 0.01 0-1 
Age 28.84 0.12 
24.25-
34.67 
Race and ethnicity 
     White (Ref) 0.66 0.03 0-1 
  Black 0.15 0.02 0-1 
  Native American 0 0 0-1 
  Asian 0.03 0.01 0-1 
  Hispanic 0.12 0.02 0-1 
  Multiple race 0.03 0 0-1 
  Other 0.01 0 0-1 
Birth country (Ref = the U.S.) 0.05 0.01 0-1 
Language (Ref = English) 0.07 0.01 0-1 
Family Socioeconomic Status 
   Parental Education 
     Less than high school 0.11 0.01 0-1 
  High school 0.31 0.01 0-1 
  Some college 0.21 0.01 0-1 
  College and above (Ref) 0.33 0.02 0-1 
  Missing 0.04 0 0-1 
Parental Employment 
     Neither working for pay 0.05 0.01 0-1 
  Either working for pay 0.34 0.01 0-1 
  Both working for pay (Ref) 0.59 0.01 0-1 
  Missing 0.02 0 0-1 
Family Income 
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  Under poverty 0.13 0.01 0-1 
  Close to poverty 0.18 0.01 0-1 
  Well above poverty 0.17 0.01 0-1 
  Middle class and above (Ref) 0.29 0.02 0-1 
  Missing 0.22 0.01 0-1 
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Table 3.2. Odds Ratios of Socioeconomic and Ideational Factors on Timing of Early Marriage, Add Health (N = 14,801) 
Variables (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
Economic Potential 
                School performance 
  
0.85 *** 
       
0.87 ** 
  Educational expectation 
    
0.73 * 
      
0.69 ** 
Early Marriage Expectation and Norms 
             Early marriage expectation 
      
2.79 *** 
   
2.8 *** 
  School norms  
        
0.54 
   
0.73 
   Neighborhood norms  
          
0.51 
 
0.62 
 Control Variables 
              Time 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 
Gender (Ref = Male) 2.02 *** 2.07 *** 2.06 *** 2 *** 2.02 *** 2.02 *** 2.08 *** 
Age 1.01 
 
1.01 
 
1.01 
 
1.02 
 
1.01 
 
1.01 
 
1.02 
 Race and ethnicity 
                Black 0.38 *** 0.37 *** 0.38 *** 0.42 *** 0.41 *** 0.4 *** 0.45 *** 
  Native American 0.46 
 
0.47 
 
0.47 
 
0.48 
 
0.48 
 
0.47 
 
0.54 
   Asian  0.4 *** 0.41 *** 0.39 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.41 *** 0.43 *** 
  Hispanic 0.82 
 
0.76 * 0.81 
 
0.83 
 
0.84 
 
0.82 
 
0.79 
   Multiple race 0.85 
 
0.79 
 
0.84 
 
0.9 
 
0.87 
 
0.87 
 
0.86 
   Other 0.29 ** 0.3 ** 0.3 ** 0.34 * 0.31 ** 0.3 ** 0.36 * 
  White (Ref) 
              Birth country (Ref = the U.S.) 1.17 
 
1.17 
 
1.19 
 
1.13 
 
1.18 
 
1.17 
 
1.16 
 Language (Ref = English) 1.11 
 
1.19 
 
1.11 
 
1.07 
 
1.12 
 
1.11 
 
1.13 
 Family Socioeconomic Status 
             Parental Education 
                Less than high school 1.86 *** 1.73 *** 1.79 *** 1.82 *** 1.89 *** 1.92 *** 1.69 *** 
  High school 1.7 *** 1.62 *** 1.65 *** 1.67 *** 1.71 *** 1.74 *** 1.57 *** 
  Some college 1.64 *** 1.6 *** 1.61 *** 1.64 *** 1.64 *** 1.66 *** 1.6 *** 
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  Missing 1.47 
 
1.4 
 
1.48 
 
1.43 
 
1.52 
 
1.53 
 
1.33 
   College and above (Ref) 
             Parental Employment 
                Neither working for pay 1.16 
 
1.18 
 
1.16 
 
1.27 
 
1.18 
 
1.19 
 
1.29 
   Either working for pay 1.03 
 
1.05 
 
1.03 
 
1.07 
 
1.04 
 
1.05 
 
1.1 
   Missing 1.89 * 2.11 ** 1.83 * 1.88 * 1.88 * 2.01 * 2.31 ** 
  Both working for pay (Ref) 
              Family Income 
                Under poverty 1.56 *** 1.55 *** 1.54 *** 1.59 *** 1.59 *** 1.59 *** 1.58 *** 
  Close to poverty 1.75 *** 1.69 *** 1.72 *** 1.78 *** 1.77 *** 1.76 *** 1.72 *** 
  Well above poverty 1.8 *** 1.76 *** 1.78 *** 1.81 *** 1.8 *** 1.81 *** 1.77 *** 
  Missing 1.64 *** 1.58 *** 1.62 *** 1.66 *** 1.65 *** 1.67 *** 1.62 *** 
  Middle class and above (Ref)                           
* p < .05, ** p < .01 and *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 3.3. Odds Ratios of Interactions between Socioeconomic and Ideational Factors on 
Timing of Early Marriage, Add Health (N = 14,801) 
Variables (1)   (2)   (3)   
Economic Potential 
        School performance 
        Educational expectation 1.26 
 
0.35 *** 0.46 *** 
Early Marriage Expectation and Norms   
     Early marriage expectation 6.29 *** 
      School norms  
  
0.03 *** 
    Neighborhood norms 
    
0.01 *** 
Interactions 
      Educational expectation*Early marriage expectation 0.36 * 
    Educational expectation*School norms 
  
35.59 ** 
  Educational expectation*Neighborhood norms  
  
160.5 *** 
Control Variables 
      Time 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 1.04 *** 
Gender (Ref = Male) 2.03 *** 2.07 *** 2.07 *** 
Age 1.02 
 
1.01 
 
1.01 
 Race and ethnicity 
        Black 0.43 *** 0.41 *** 0.4 *** 
  Native American 0.49 
 
0.49 
 
0.48 
   Asian 0.41 *** 0.39 *** 0.38 *** 
  Hispanic 0.82 
 
0.82 
 
0.8 
   Multiple race 0.89 
 
0.85 
 
0.84 
   Other 0.35 * 0.31 ** 0.3 ** 
  White (Ref) 
      Birth country (Ref = the U.S.) 1.15 
 
1.18 
 
1.19 
 Language (Ref = English) 1.1 
 
1.11 
 
1.11 
 Family Socioeconomic Status 
      Parental Education 
        Less than high school 1.72 *** 1.82 *** 1.84 *** 
  High school 1.61 *** 1.63 *** 1.66 *** 
  Some college 1.61 *** 1.6 *** 1.61 *** 
  Missing 1.43 
 
1.55 * 1.59 * 
  College and above (Ref) 
      Parental Employment 
        Neither working for pay 1.27 
 
1.21 
 
1.22 
   Either working for pay 1.07 
 
1.03 
 
1.05 
   Missing 1.78 * 1.78 * 1.91 * 
  Both working for pay (Ref) 
      Family Income 
        Under poverty 1.54 *** 1.55 *** 1.55 *** 
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  Close to poverty 1.75 *** 1.72 *** 1.72 *** 
  Well above poverty 1.79 *** 1.78 *** 1.79 *** 
  Missing 1.63 *** 1.62 *** 1.64 *** 
  Middle class and above (Ref)             
* p < .05, ** p < .01 and *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). 
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CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation research synthesizes the economic rational choice approach, the 
social psychological reasoned action approach, and the sociological social norms perspective 
to propose an economic-noneconomic-motivation-interaction framework. The integrative 
approach is employed to examine marriage formation in both Western and non-Western 
contexts, marriage timing in Nepal and early marriage timing in the United States. The 
framework is supported in both settings.  
 The implication is that economic considerations/calculations regarding marriage are 
regulated by social norms and cultural stipulations in the specific context. It is risky to 
assume economic factors have similar effects in the same direction on family behaviors in 
different societies, and specifically, it is risky to uncritically, directly apply models 
concerning family behaviors in Western, industrialized societies to non-Western settings. For 
future research, it is important to use more economic indicators, such as employment, income, 
and occupation to better understand individuals’ economic considerations/calculations. 
 Further, this framework contributes to the literature of family formation and 
stratification by adding complexity of interaction between economic and cultural factors. 
Marriage at a normative time is usually reported to be related to socioeconomic and 
psychological benefits for both men and women while early marriage is deemed to have a 
negative impact on women and their children. The cultural factors in this framework 
contributes to the literature that different groups of different socioeconomic statuses
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regulated by different social norms in their social contexts may cumulate their advantage or 
disadvantage through marriage formation behaviors. However, it also deserves note here that 
when using personal beliefs and expectations as cultural factors to examine timing of 
marriage, the issue of endogeneity should be considered. It is thus important to include time-
varying measures into the investigation.      
 Moreover, this framework is tested only on marriage formation in Nepal and the 
United States. It can be expanded to broader family behaviors and even health behaviors, 
such as cohabitation, marital stability, household labor division and divorce. Future research 
should also test this approach in various societies, especially transitional societies.    
 Along the line of understanding marriage behaviors in different contexts, I use both 
qualitative and quantitative data to investigate women’s post-marriage education in Nepal. 
The Nepalese women do not necessarily forgo or delay marriage to pursue their educational 
goal. Facing the expansion of mass education and other nonfamily institutions and services, a 
significant number of women manage to take both family and student roles. The cultural 
context of universal and early marriage and extended family and patrilocal living 
arrangements is relevant here to this “inventive” family behavior. Future research should also 
pay attention to variations within the cultural context, such as comparing those living with 
parents after marriage and those not. It is important to be aware of the potential endogeneity 
issues: for example, college students may either postpone marriage for education or have to 
get married in school due to family pressure. Overall, the implication is that that family 
behaviors in developing countries do not necessarily converge to the Western pattern as 
modernization theory would predict. It is important to understand how people are inventive 
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in their own lives embedded in the social context of historical culture and increasing 
westernizing and industrializing forces.  
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Appendix I: 
Exploratory Fieldwork on Marriage Processes in Nepal 
Interview Guide 
 Introduction:  Thank you for agreeing to talk to us about your marriage process.  We 
appreciate you taking time out of your busy day to talk with me. My name is _____, and I am 
from the Institute for Social and Environmental Research here in Chitwan. I help Yingchun Ji, 
a Ph.D. student in the US coming from China, to conduct research.  She is very interested to 
learn everything she can from you.  Because she comes from a different country, she doesn’t 
know very much about marriage and having children in Nepal, so she looks forward to 
learning from you.  For the next one hour or so, we would like to have a conversation with 
you about when and why you decided to get married. Please feel free to share your story with 
us since you are the expert about what you thought and did in your life. Yingchun has 
provided me questions to ask you.  Even if it seems that I might know the answer to the 
question I am asking you, remember that Yingchun does not know much about life in Nepal, 
so that is why she is asking even the simplest questions.  Please provide her with full and 
detailed answers, so she can learn a lot.  Remember, if you ever feel like stopping our 
conversation, just tell us and we will stop. We don’t want to be a bother to you. Now I will 
ask you questions. If it is alright with you, Yingchun is recording your interview so we can 
translate it later, and she can read it.  Is that alright with you? OK, let’s get started... 
 
Demographics 
1. In the process of selecting you to participate in this study, we asked some questions 
about your age at marriage, education level and other things, now we would like to 
collect a few more details on you and your spouse.  How old are you currently? 
2. Are you currently enrolled in school or do you have any plans to obtain any more 
education or training?  IF YES:  What are your educational goals? 
3. How many years of education does your spouse have? Is your spouse currently 
enrolled in school or thinking of going back for more education?  IF YES:  What are 
his/her education plans? 
4. When did you get married? What month and year? How old was your spouse when 
you got married? 
5. What caste/ethnicity is your spouse? 
6. Have you ever worked outside the home? If yes, what kind of work is/was that? Are 
you currently working outside the home? If not, why did you stop working outside 
the home? 
7. Has your spouse ever worked outside the home? If yes, what kind of work is/was that? 
Is he/she currently working outside the home? If not, why did she/he stop working 
outside the home? 
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The Marriage Story 
8. Now we would like to ask you to tell us about how your marriage came to be, who 
started the process, how you first met your spouse, and how you felt during the 
process.  Can you tell us the story of how it unfolded? 
• Was it an arranged marriage or a love marriage, or some combination? What 
exactly do you mean by this?  Can you describe to me what that type of marriage 
is like—I mean what usually happens in the beginning and all the way through to 
the marriage ceremonies? 
• Did it happen quickly or take a lot of time?  What were the steps in the process? 
• Tell me how you met your spouse. Was there any middle-person who helped to 
arrange the meeting? Who is this person? Tell me more about how it came. Is the 
way you met your spouse the normal way that people do and get married? If not, 
what is the normal way?  
• Who initiated the marriage process (e.g., self, spouse, one of the other family 
members, neighbors, etc.)?  
• Was your family involved in deciding whether, when, and with whom you should 
get married? How did they get involved?  
• Did anyone else get involved too, such as your friends, neighbors or your 
spouse’s family? Can you tell me the story about it?  
• Did others ever have different opinions than you had? Facing the conflict, what 
were your decisions and what did you do? What actually happened eventually? 
Can you tell the story about it? 
9. Did you consciously/seriously think before you got married that you would get 
married at some point in your life?   
• Did you think through things like, what good things marriage will bring me or 
what bad things marriage will bring me? What was your thinking? 
• Did you think about when would be a good time/age to get married? Tell me more 
about what you thought about and considered before you actually got married.  
• Did you think about whether education would be good for your marriage?  Did 
you think you should finish school before getting married?  What were your 
thoughts on education when you thought about getting married?  Why were you 
thinking that? 
• Do you think it is good to have a plan for marriage or to think it over thoroughly 
before you get married? Why? 
10. Are you and your spouse currently living on your own? If not, are you living with 
your parents or your spouse’ parents? Did you live with your parents/spouse’s parents 
right when you got married? Has your or your spouse’s living arrangements changed 
since your marriage? Can you explain to me where you and your spouse have lived 
since the time of your marriage and why it has been like that?  
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11. Do you think the amount of education you have gave you any advantage or 
disadvantage when you were getting married?  How so? 
12. Can you tell me any successful or not very successful marriage stories of any friends, 
relatives, or neighbors you know, due to the fact that he/she has some education or 
has no education?  
13. Do you think the amount of work experience you have/having no work experience 
gave you any advantage or disadvantage when you were getting married?  How so? 
14. Can you tell me any successful or not very successful marriage stories of any friends 
or relatives, neighbors you know, due to the fact that he/she has nonfamily experience 
or has no such experience?  
 
Timing of Marriage 
15. People have different feelings about the timing of their own marriage.  Sometimes it 
happens faster or earlier than expected, sometimes it is exactly as planned, and 
sometimes it takes awhile to find the right person.   
• At the time the marriage details were being decided, were you feeling that it was 
the right time for you to get married, or did it seem too early, or later than you had 
expected?  Explain how so.   
• In general, when do you think is too early to marry? How long is too long to wait 
to marry?  Why is that?  Can you explain? 
• Do you know other people who had different experiences or feelings about the 
timing of their marriages?  How so?  
Specific Questions about significant others: Mother/Father/family 
members/friends/neighbors 
• How were your parents feeling about the timing of your marriage in the months 
before the marriage?  Were they thinking it was time?  Too early?  Past time?  
How did they express their feelings to you?  What kinds of things did they say?  
How could you tell what they thought?  
• What about neighbors or friends?  Did they express opinions about the timing of 
your marriage?  Did they show approval/disapproval?  What about their attitudes 
about the timing of marriage in general?  How do people tend to feel about this? 
 
Potential Spouse Characteristics  
16. Back to when you decided who to marry, what kind of characteristics made for an 
attractive spouse candidate? Why did you think these characteristics were important? 
Tell me a little more about what you thought.   
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• Was age of the spouse important?  Education?  Work experience?  Personality?  
Family background?  What are all the things to consider? What are the most 
important things? 
 
17. In your opinion, why is it important that a spouse candidate has a good level of 
education/work experience/ good personality/ good family? What would be the 
difference between marrying someone with or without that characteristic?  How 
would the marriage be different if marrying someone with or without that 
characteristic? (Note: when asking these questions, ask one characteristic at one time)?  
REPEAT FOR ALL CHARACTERISTICS DISCUSSED ABOVE. 
18. Did you think his/her family background was important in terms of marriage? If so, 
what are important characteristics?  
• Did you think the following factors were important: parental education, whether 
parents have worked or not, number of siblings, living with parents after marriage, 
and so forth. Tell me more about what you think and why you think so. 
19. Did your family have different opinions about what is important about whom to 
marry? What did they think?   
20. Did your friends and neighbors have different opinions about what is important about 
whom to marry? What did they think? 
21. Facing different opinions, especially opinions different than yours, how was the 
decision made?  Did you have final say, or did your family make the decision?  How 
was that process?  Was there a lot of discussion, or how did it work? 
22. What kind of characteristics, experiences, or anything else did you or your family 
think you should have to be a good spouse candidate yourself?  What was it about 
you that made you a good spouse candidate?  Please explain why. 
Ideal Age of Marriage 
23. Now I want to ask you whether you had an idea in mind before you got married about 
the best age for you to get married. If yes, what was it? Can you tell me more about 
what it means to you? How and where did you get the idea of a good age for marriage? 
Did you get married before/at/after your preferred age? Have you changed your ideas 
about when it is good to marry? If so, when and why? 
24. What would you advise currently unmarried people now about the best age or time at 
which to marry?  What would your advice be? 
25. Different people might have different ideas about the right age to get married. For 
example, your parents, your friends, your neighbors or others might have different 
ideas. Among all these people including yourself, whose idea is the most important? 
Whose idea did you actually follow when you got married? Can you tell me more 
about how you made the decision and what you thought at that time? 
26. What if any should be the qualifications for being ready to be married? Age? 
Education? Outside-of-home work experience? Family support? Being ready to have 
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children? What if someone has not finished with school but falls in love while parents 
insist this person to finish school first?   
 
General Family Attitudes and Attitude Formation 
27. Other than the ideal age of marriage, people have other attitudes/opinions towards 
marriage on different issues.  
• For example, some people think girls should marry before menstruation. What do 
you think about it? Why?  
• Some people think individuals should get married before or at their ideal age of 
marriage. Do you agree? Why?  
• Some people think it is important to their mothers to get married. Do you agree? 
Why? 
• Can you think of other ideas/attitudes that are important about whether or when to 
get married? What are they? Which are more important according to your opinion? 
Whose ideas are these: yours, your family's, your friends’, neighbors’, or others' 
in general? 
28. How many children are you thinking you would like to have?  Is there a number you 
would prefer?  What is your thinking behind that?  Did you prefer the same number 
before you were married?  Did the process of getting married change your thoughts 
on how many children to have?  Did you talk to your wife/husband about this before 
getting married?  Did wanting to have children, or a certain number, relate to when 
you thought it would be good to get married? 
29. Have you thought about whether you will use family planning methods to have a 
certain number of children?  Do you mind sharing what you are thinking about these 
things?  Do you think you will use some type of contraception at some point?  Are 
these things you talk with your wife/husband about, or not?  Do you feel like you 
know a lot about different methods, or at least what the best methods are, or not yet?  
IF YES… from where have you learned about different options for family planning?  
30. Is there anything else about the marriage process in Nepal you think Yingchun should 
know?  Did we ask questions about everything?  What other things are important in 
when a person gets married or how it happens?  
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